A thought experiment about self

A recent thread in OT reminded me of a thought experiment I once posed; I brought it up in an OT thread a while ago, but I realized it might make good discussion material here as well.

The general atheist answer to the question of "What is there after death?" is "nothing", with the justification that our physical bodies are fully and entirely what make us who we are, and that there is nothing beyond "you" than your body.  I recognize there are atheists with different answers to the question, but for the purposes of this thought experiment, we'll assume that this is both the correct answer and the correct justification.

So, keeping that assumption in mind - that the entirety of who "you" are is your physical body - I propose the following thought experiments and invite especially those who agree with the above answer to respond, but anyone can chime in if they want.  There's no right or wrong answer that I'm looking for, and I'm not intending to prove any position wrong; this is purely a hypothetical to make you think about the implications of what you might believe and ensure its logical coherence.

The scenarios are as follows:

Scenario A

Some time in the future, a teleporter is built.  It functions much like a fax machine: it scans your body, makes a note of its exact composition and structure right down to the atomic level, and then it deconstructs your body into its component atoms and places them aside.  It then transmits this information to a receiver, which takes atoms it has stored away and reconstructs your body exactly as it was when you entered the transmitter, right down to the atom.  You enter this teleporter, and as advertised, it deconstructs your body and reconstructs it at the receiver precisely as it entered the transmitter.

The question: Is this person constructed at the receiver "you"?  That is to say, you entered the teleporter a conscious entity perceiving itself as a unique individual apart from all others; is that same consciousness present at the receiver?  Would you experience a momentary lapse in consciousness when your body is deconstructed, and would you then regain consciousness in this newly constructed body in the receiver?  If the answer is "no", what difference is there - if we are nothing more than our physical body, then why would we not experience ourselves as conscious in this new physical body?

Scenario B

The same teleporter as above is created, except there is one fundamental difference: it acts even more like a fax machine now, and rather than deconstructing the person who enters, it leaves that person completely intact.  However, it still scans the person's precise atomic structure and constructs another person precisely the same right down to the atom at the receiver.  You enter this teleporter, and just as it says, it scans you and creates an exact copy of you right down to the atomic level that is constructed at the receiver.

The question: As above, is this person constructed at the receiver "you"?  Would you now be conscious in two different locations at the same time?  If the answer is "no", then as in scenario A, what difference is there?  If, again, we are nothing more than our physical body, then what would differentiate "you" - that is, the conscious entity responding to this question - from this exact copy of you, such that you would only experience consciousness in one of the two bodies, but not the other?  What could you identify as the factor that makes you "you" as opposed to the exact copy of you, if indeed who "you" are is entirely defined by your physical body?

Scenario C

This time, in addition to a machine that creates an exact copy of a subject, we additionally have invented a stasis machine - a machine that renders its inhabitant unconscious, but perfectly preserved.  You enter this stasis machine, and are placed into unconscious stasis.  While you are in this state, the machine to create an exact copy of a subject is activated, and while you are unconscious, an exact copy of you is created and placed into another stasis machine.  These stasis machines are turned off at precisely the same time, and their inhabitants regain consciousness at precisely the same time as well.

The question: Which one of these two individuals is "you"?  That is to say, you were a conscious entity who then lost consciousness, and now two identical unconscious bodies are brought back to consciousness - in which body will you perceive your consciousness as residing?  If your answer is that it will reside in one body but not the other, how do you differentiate between one body and the other?  Keep in mind when answering that they are identical right down to the atomic level, and are thus physically the same body.

I think that should do it for now.  I'm interested to hear your responses!

First of all some clarification questions:

In all 3 scenarios, the machines which reproduce me or produce a copy of me, are they capable of transferring memories, knowledge etc as well?

Scenario 1: Wont that kill me in the process? I mean if you mutilate me and cut me in pieces, no matter how well your reconstruct me, wont I already be dead?

_________

Anyway lets assume it doesnt kill me.

Scenario 1:

If the machine can preserve my thoughts, memories, knowledge etc (all that is my self-image, the identity of "me") then I think that yes, it is still me.

Scenario 2: 

Again if the machine can preserve (in this case copy) my thoughts, memories, knowledge etc then....

....for a duration yes I would have to say the person created is "me" but since we will go on living separate lives after that then we wont any longer be the same person.

Scenario 3:

Just like scenario 2, if the machine can copy my thoughts, memories, knowledge etc then...

the same as scenario 2 really. :P

_____________

Although I dont know if it would be correct to call that "new" person "me". I think it would be best to call it "an exact copy of me" (for the last 2 scenarios).

And the first one is really tricky. I mean maybe the person resulting is everything that is me. But will it really be me. I mean if I, George went into that machine would my consciousness survive, or does it get lost in the process even though an exact same consciousness is created?

This is confusing.

It really depends on what is meant by "exact compostion and structure" and also if the sub-atomic level detail would be required for such hocus-pocus. But, if such things were possible, I'd say:

Scenareo A

The person at the other end is not made out the the same physical material as you. That is set aside at the transmitter if I'm not mistaken. I'd imagine that you would experience a loss of conciousness if the process were not instantaneous - it may also hurt. The facsimile - the new you - would have conciousness and memories, as reconstrtucted by neural pathways and brain mapping (2.0).

Scenareo B

As with A, the new person made with new material at point B would be another independent "you" with a seperate conciousness, but the same prior experience and bad habits.

Sceanreo C

For the sake of legal responsibility - all copies should really be you. If a muderer jumped into the copier after committing the crime, all copies would be complicit. This does raise issues about the responsibility of copies for the previous actions of the copied.

But the one made from the original material would be be the most "real" you.

What is the point here? Isnt god capable of recreating an exact "you"?

What makes me uniQue is the fact that current technology and biological expertise doesnt allow an exact reproduction of "me" and neither will it in the near future.

So even if an atheist accepts that an exact reproduction is possible, what exactly is the implication here I dont understand?

Secondly I am a complete agnostic when it comes to consiousness and the problem of "who and what is the me in me". My answer to "what happens after death" is "probably nothing" but I fully accept that it's nothing more than a most probable guess. So I am not sure where did you get this that the general atheist outright says that there is nothing after death.

Before I post my opinions, I have to say that I'm a naturalist and as such, I believe that our identity is synomynous with both our bodies and a consciousness. Since our bodies cease to function once we die, I believe that our consciousnesses, as an extention to our bodies, ceases to function as well and simply turns off like a computer.

Scenario A

Since every microscopic part of you is replicated, then you are the same person at the receiver.

Scenario B

You would be conscious in two different locations. You probably wouldn't live very long because you haven't adapted to living in two separate bodies.

Scenario C

You would be the person who is conscious at the time. If multiple copies of you are conscious, then there are just as many you's.

Scenario B

You would be conscious in two different locations. You probably wouldn't live very long because you haven't adapted to living in two separate bodies.

Genetic_Code

You make it seem as if the consciousness would be contiguous across the two bodies... would they be connected, or would they be "the same" but separate ("the same" merely in the sense they were the same until they started experiencing something new)?foxhound_fox

Both eyes are directed by one consciousness. In a disorienting sense, both bodies would be directed by one consciousness that is stored within two separate brains. I'm speaking out of my top hat here, because I honestly don't know.

Both eyes are directed by one consciousness. In a disorienting sense, both bodies would be directed by one consciousness that is stored within two separate brains. I'm speaking out of my top hat here, because I honestly don't know.

Genetic_Code

Cool, good to see this has generated interest. :)  To respond to the answers thus far...

First of all some clarification questions:

In all 3 scenarios, the machines which reproduce me or produce a copy of me, are they capable of transferring memories, knowledge etc as well?

Teenaged

If one believes that who one is is entirely one's physical body, then it would necessarily follow that creating a physical copy would also transfer memories, knowledge, and everything else.

Scenario 1: Wont that kill me in the process? I mean if you mutilate me and cut me in pieces, no matter how well your reconstruct me, wont I already be dead?

Teenaged

That depends on what one's conception of "life" is, but in the sense that your biologically functioning body would no longer exist, yes, you would be "dead", but upon reconstruction your biologically functioning body would be back.

Scenario 1:

If the machine can preserve my thoughts, memories, knowledge etc (all that is my self-image, the identity of "me") then I think that yes, it is still me.

Teenaged

But would you be conscious within that body once it is reconstructed?  That is, would it truly be "you", the same "you" who was conscious prior to the initial deconstruction?

Scenario 2: 

Again if the machine can preserve (in this case copy) my thoughts, memories, knowledge etc then....

....for a duration yes I would have to say the person created is "me" but since we will go on living separate lives after that then we wont any longer be the same person.

Teenaged

But the question is talking about "you" as in the conscious individual - would your consciousness be in this second body as well immediately after its creation?  If not, what differentiates you from the other body?  They are physically identical.

Scenario 3:

Just like scenario 2, if the machine can copy my thoughts, memories, knowledge etc then...

the same as scenario 2 really. :P

Teenaged

But which is "you"?  When both bodies are reanimated, in which one do "you" inhabit consciousness?

This is confusing.

Teenaged

That's the idea. :P

It really depends on what is meant by "exact compostion and structure" and also if the sub-atomic level detail would be required for such hocus-pocus. But, if such things were possible, I'd say:

RationalAtheist

What I mean is that the new creation is exactly physically identical to you.  The how and why isn't important, as this is just a thought experiment.

Scenareo A

The person at the other end is not made out the the same physical material as you. That is set aside at the transmitter if I'm not mistaken. I'd imagine that you would experience a loss of conciousness if the process were not instantaneous - it may also hurt. The facsimile - the new you - would have conciousness and memories, as reconstrtucted by neural pathways and brain mapping (2.0).

RationalAtheist

But would it be your consciousness - in other words, would you regain consciousness in this newly constructed body?  If not, why not?  An atom is an atom - if two items are physically identical, then they are physically identical, so if consciousness is nothing more than a function of your physical body, why would you not be conscious in this new physical body once it regains consciousness?

Scenareo B

As with A, the new person made with new material at point B would be another independent "you" with a seperate conciousness, but the same prior experience and bad habits.

RationalAtheist

But, again, if consciousness is nothing more than a function of one's physical body, then what would make one body's consciousness yours while the other is not?  What could you point to within that other you that would differentiate it from you, and would make its consciousness not your own?

Sceanreo C

For the sake of legal responsibility - all copies should really be you. If a muderer jumped into the copier after committing the crime, all copies would be complicit. This does raise issues about the responsibility of copies for the previous actions of the copied.

But the one made from the original material would be be the most "real" you.

RationalAtheist

But what would make it, as you say "the most 'real' you"?  It is identical in every way, and it wakes up at exactly the same time as you.  What makes one of the two bodies "you", but not the other?  What provides the differentiator?

What is the point here? Isnt god capable of recreating an exact "you"?

Gambler_3

The point is to make you think about your conception of life, death, and self, nothing more, nothing less.  I'm not seeking to disprove anything, but rather to inspire thought.

What makes me uniQue is the fact that current technology and biological expertise doesnt allow an exact reproduction of "me" and neither will it in the near future.

So even if an atheist accepts that an exact reproduction is possible, what exactly is the implication here I dont understand?

Gambler_3

Well, the premise is what I said at the beginning: that consciousness and self is simply limited to one's physical body, which is something that many (though I recognize not all) atheists believe.  I am simply taking that premise and creating scenarios that challenge those who hold it to think about it and fully investigate the logical implications that that position creates.  The ultimate question is this: If who "you" are is entirely defined by your physical body, then if we create another human physically identical to you, then is that also "you"?  And if not, what makes it not "you"?

 

Secondly I am a complete agnostic when it comes to consiousness and the problem of "who and what is the me in me". My answer to "what happens after death" is "probably nothing" but I fully accept that it's nothing more than a most probable guess. So I am not sure where did you get this that the general atheist outright says that there is nothing after death.

Gambler_3

Because they do, all the time.  Every time the question of life after death comes up in OT, by far the most prevalent opinion among atheists is always that there is nothing, and that once your physical body stops functioning, "you" cease to exist.

A

It is the same "person" before and after. Our bodies are a collection of structurized cells that die and reproduce all the time... so to say that we are not the "same person" after the transporter cannot transmit the "persistent self" is kind of absurd from my perspective. Our bodies are constantly altering themselves, and never "persist" in the same sense for more than a few seconds (cells are probably dying all the time).

foxhound_fox

So then, to make sure I understand, you do believe that you would lose consciousness, but would then regain consciousness in the reconstructed body?

B

"The Prestige" all over again. And the answer would be yes, it is the "same" person, only doubled. I don't see how even if there was a "persistent self" it couldn't be copied and exist in two bodies at once... especially if that self was not supernatural in origin, but naturally bound and detectable.

foxhound_fox

But would you experience consciousness in two bodies at the same time?  In other words, would your consciousness expand to inhabit this second body as well, or would it have its own consciousness?  And if it would have its own consciousness, then why?  If the only thing responsible for your consciousness is your physical body, then how could two physically identical bodies have different consciousnesses?  What makes the difference?

C

Again, two "you's." I've never been able to understand the idea of a "persistent self" and I think Buddhism really opened me up to that fact. It just doesn't sit well with me to think that there is somehow, a supernatural "soul" inside my physical body that somehow, cannot be copied and lives on eternally after I die. I can understand energy existing post-mordem, like a gathering of it leaving the body, but a full conscious ghost-like entity that can move between bodies (as in Hinduism) or a "soul" being that ascends to a supernatural realm like Heaven? It just doesn't make sense to me.

I've always been a naturalist... and even if we find "God" or whatever, the thing is, it will cease to be "God" in the sense of it being supernatural, and become natural, and objectively verifiable.

foxhound_fox

Well, yes, two "you's"... but which one is truly "you"?  When you were put in stasis, you perceived yourself as a conscious entity that inhabits a body.  When you wake up, you will (if I read your response correctly) still be present and perceiving yourself still as a conscious entity that inhabits a body... but which body would it be?  And why?  As before, what makes the difference, and what would enable someone to point to one of the two bodies and declare that to be the "you" - i.e., the consciousness - that existed before the copying?

Scenario A

Since every microscopic part of you is replicated, then you are the same person at the receiver.

Genetic_Code

But would it be "you"?  In other words, would you lose consciousness and then regain it in this new body?

Scenario B

You would be conscious in two different locations. You probably wouldn't live very long because you haven't adapted to living in two separate bodies.

Scenario C

You would be the person who is conscious at the time. If multiple copies of you are conscious, then there are just as many you's.

Genetic_Code

Hmm, interesting, you're the only one (as far as I can tell) who has made that conclusion.  How would that work, though?  Each body has its own brain and its own neural processes, and aside from being physically identical, there is no connection of any kind.  How could you inhabit the same body with the same consciousness if the bodies are disconnected and with brains unto themselves?

[QUOTE="RationalAtheist"]

Scenareo A

The person at the other end is not made out the the same physical material as you. That is set aside at the transmitter if I'm not mistaken. I'd imagine that you would experience a loss of conciousness if the process were not instantaneous - it may also hurt. The facsimile - the new you - would have conciousness and memories, as reconstrtucted by neural pathways and brain mapping (2.0).

GabuEx

But would it be your consciousness - in other words, would you regain consciousness in this newly constructed body? If not, why not? An atom is an atom - if two items are physically identical, then they are physically identical, so if consciousness is nothing more than a function of your physical body, why would you not be conscious in this new physical body once it regains consciousness?

Your new body would contain a new consciousness that is exactly the same as the transmitted body's one, so it would appear to be the very same consciousness. It would be a separate consciousness though, independent of the first body.

[QUOTE="RationalAtheist"]

Scenareo B

As with A, the new person made with new material at point B would be another independent "you" with a seperate conciousness, but the same prior experience and bad habits.

GabuEx

But, again, if consciousness is nothing more than a function of one's physical body, then what would make one body's consciousness yours while the other is not? What could you point to within that other you that would differentiate it from you, and would make its consciousness not your own?

Both new people would initially have exactly the same memories, experience and identity to start off with. They would both have identical singular independent consciousnesses, but their shared experience would stop at the transmission of the facsimile. It would diverge from there on in.

[QUOTE="RationalAtheist"]

Sceanreo C

For the sake of legal responsibility - all copies should really be you. If a murderer jumped into the copier after committing the crime, all copies would be complicit. This does raise issues about the responsibility of copies for the previous actions of the copied.

But the one made from the original material would be be the most "real" you.

GabuEx

But what would make it, as you say "the most 'real' you"? It is identical in every way, and it wakes up at exactly the same time as you. What makes one of the two bodies "you", but not the other? What provides the differentiator?

There would be no discernible difference between the facsimile and the original, so the only differentiators would be time lived, method of origin, and the originality of the materials used in copying. I used "real" to infer original and didn't mean to imply that one version had any more significance.

What do you think yourself, Gabu?

Your new body would contain a new consciousness that is exactly the same as the transmitted body's one, so it would appear to be the very same consciousness. It would be a separate consciousness though, independent of the first body.

RationalAtheist

What would make it different, though?  If one's consciousness is purely a product of one's physical body, then would the recreation of one's exact physical body not also recreate the exact same consciousness?  Right now, you perceive yourself as a conscious entity in a body; if you went into this teleporter, what would be different such that that same consciousness would not be present in it as well?  Where did "you" go in the process?

Both new people would initially have exactly the same memories, experience and identity to start off with. They would both have identical singular independent consciousnesses, but their shared experience would stop at the transmission of the facsimile. It would diverge from there on in.

RationalAtheist

But I'm not sure if this is addressing the root issue that this thought experiment is getting at.  As I said, right now you perceive yourself as a conscious entity in a body, and typically atheists will say that that is simply a product of one's physical body.  Why, then, would "you" not also inhabit the other body, if indeed it is physically identical?  If consciousness is simply a product of one's physical body, then what creates the difference that makes them independent consciousnesses?  This thought experiment's purpose is largely to investigate the real nature and essence of what consciousness truly is and is not, and I feel that this may be getting lost in the details along the way.

There would be no discernible difference between the facsimile and the original, so the only differentiators would be time lived, method of origin, and the originality of the materials used in copying. I used "real" to infer original and didn't mean to imply that one version had any more significance.

RationalAtheist

Right, but my point is that one's origin and actual time lived are more or less irrelevant in terms of the actual physical state of the body.  If "you" would identifiably perceive yourself as a conscious individual in one but not both of the bodies, despite their being physically identical, then the question is why - what is different between the two that would cause the consciousnesses too be different even at the moment that both regain consciousness?

What do you think yourself, Gabu?

RationalAtheist

Right, my apologies, I suppose I should have answered these questions myself as well.

Well, to be honest I don't really know, which is kind of a boring answer, but it's basically nonetheless the truth.  Based on thoughts such as the ones in this thread, I tend to believe that there is more to consciousness than one's physical body, which to me would indicate that the answer would be that scenario A would be undetermined and that in scenarios B and C "you" would inhabit the same body you've always inhabited, since the new body, although physically identical, would lack an identical source of consciousness (whatever that source may be).  If I believed that consciousness was entirely determined by one's physical body, though, then I feel that I would have great difficulty answering any of these questions, which is why I was interested to see others' responses who do believe that.

But would you be conscious within that body once it is reconstructed?  That is, would it truly be "you", the same "you" who was conscious prior to the initial deconstruction?GabuEx

Yeah I sort of wondered about that in my edit.
The way I see it (if I stretch it a bit) we can say that a previous version of our consciousness dies every second but it is still us.
Perhaps its that case here too. Perhaps yes our own conscious dies momentarily in the process of reconstruction but it is still our consciousness after that. It is still me experiencingit and not just an exact copy of me with now its own will, separate from mine (who I would be dead if I considered the new "me" as just a copy of me but not me).
Although I reach that "conclusion" only if I consider the above happens. If I dont I dont think the new me is me; its just a copy of me. Yes its identity is the same as me, but it is a separate entity than the previous me.
But.....idk.

But the question is talking about "you" as in the conscious individual - would your consciousness be in this second body as well immediately after its creation?  If not, what differentiates you from the other body?  They are physically identical.GabuEx

No I think my consciousness would still be in my original body, not the copy. The copy is an identical to me, yet separate, consciousness.

What differentiates me is I guess the fact that my consciousness has been with my body from the beginning. There is no reason why my consciousness would be transferred to the other body. Besides the proceedure here is one of copying not trasferring.

But which is "you"?  When both bodies are reanimated, in which one do "you" inhabit consciousness? GabuEx

Yeah I sort of wondered about that in my edit.
The way I see it (if I stretch it a bit) we can say that a previous version of our consciousness dies every second but it is still us.
Perhaps its that case here too. Perhaps yes our own conscious dies momentarily in the process of reconstruction but it is still our consciousness after that. It is still me experiencingit and not just an exact copy of me with now its own will, separate from mine (who I would be dead if I considered the new "me" as just a copy of me but not me).
Although I reach that "conclusion" only if I consider the above happens. If I dont I dont think the new me is me; its just a copy of me. Yes its identity is the same as me, but it is a separate entity than the previous me.
But.....idk.

Teenaged

Again, though, the question remains: what makes one body "you" while the other is not "you"?  If one's consciousness - that is, that which makes you "you" - is purely physical in nature, then why would a copy not have the same consciousness?

No I think my consciousness would still be in my original body, not the copy. The copy is an identical to me, yet separate, consciousness.

What differentiates me is I guess the fact that my consciousness has been with my body from the beginning. There is no reason why my consciousness would be transferred to the other body. Besides the proceedure here is one of copying not trasferring.

Teenaged

The same as above and for the same reasons. My body stays with the body it originally was. I dont find a reason to assume it will move to another body.

Teenaged

Again, though, the question remains: what makes one body "you" while the other is not "you"?  If one's consciousness - that is, that which makes you "you" - is purely physical in nature, then why would a copy not have the same consciousness?GabuEx

Here I have no sound reasoning behind that answer. I just see it intuitively and am influenced by what happens if you die by means of mutilation, being chopped to pieces etc. No matter the means you have to reconstrauct yourself, you cant undo death. Merely a reconstruction doesnt grant life again.

And assuming that the machine has the capability to do the above I still feel that something will "die" in the process and that would be my consciousness. Now after the reconstruction, by rebuilding me the "structure" of my conscousness is being reconstructed too but that doesnt grant the continuation that I believe is needed to trasfer "me". I believe continuation is needed because there is an interval where my consciousness has ceased to exist (since my material self (which we assume is the only thing that exists) has been dismantled and can no longer facilitate -for that duration- a consciousness. Peraps I am seeing consciousness here as something analogous to life and how if you die (aside from claims of being revived after clinically being dead)you cant be alive again. Idk...

God this is confusing if anything simply because I cant find an effective way to express the difference between consciousness as in just the identity of who I am, and what is actually me (for instance what happened in the movie Avatar when someone was being trasferred ino their new blue bodies :P - there was a transfer of the person's consciousness). Unless of course we consider the memories,knowledge etc (which make up our identity) and consciousness as one and the same thing or two things that must go together. In which case.... ***

But the whole thing here, though, is that if what defines your consciousness is entirely within your physical body, then that would imply that a physically identical body should also have a completely identical consciousness.  What you are saying here is effectively denying that, which seems to me would also implicitly deny the idea that that is the full extent of consciousness.GabuEx

I dont live in both bodies like G_C answered and neither does my consciousness get transferredto the other body. It just gets copied, giving an exact copy of me, BUT that copy is living separately from me even if our consciousnesses are identical. I dont see why it would have to be otherwise.

***....what I just said is being invalidated and what G_C said seems to be possible. Me living in two separate bodies. But doesnt living in two separate bodies sort of introduces something supernatural? I mean how else could someone "divide" (not literally as in half and half) their consciousness between two bodies?

Unless of course I pull a "Vandalvideo" and claim that we cant know what capabilities matter has.

So then, to make sure I understand, you do believe that you would lose consciousness, but would then regain consciousness in the reconstructed body?GabuEx

But would you experience consciousness in two bodies at the same time? In other words, would your consciousness expand to inhabit this second body as well, or would it have its own consciousness? And if it would have its own consciousness, then why? If the only thing responsible for your consciousness is your physical body, then how could two physically identical bodies have different consciousnesses? What makes the difference?GabuEx

Well, yes, two "you's"... but which one is truly "you"? When you were put in stasis, you perceived yourself as a conscious entity that inhabits a body. When you wake up, you will (if I read your response correctly) still be present and perceiving yourself still as a conscious entity that inhabits a body... but which body would it be? And why? As before, what makes the difference, and what would enable someone to point to one of the two bodies and declare that to be the "you" - i.e., the consciousness - that existed before the copying?GabuEx

To answer any of these questions I would have to know what "I" am (which I suppose is what you're driving at). It opens up all sorts of questions to ponder:

What is the nature of "identity" itself? Does anybody really know what "we" are? What is the nature of consciousness itself? Could "I" inhabit two versions of "me" simulataneously, and what are "me" and "I"? Am I truly "unique", in the deepest sense of the word?

I don't think anybody can really answer these questions; that person would have to understand the nature of identity itself, which I don't think anybody does. Asking these questions just leads back to one of the fundamental questions of humanity: Who am I?

Very thought provoking. As it is often with questions like this, you only open up more questions by asking them. It seems almost arrogant to claim to know the answers to these questions. It would require a supposed knowledge of the answers to the other questions, which I don't think any human truly has. I don't think we'll ever know; I think it might be beyond human capacity to "know".

[QUOTE="RationalAtheist"]

Your new body would contain a new consciousness that is exactly the same as the transmitted body's one, so it would appear to be the very same consciousness. It would be a separate consciousness though, independent of the first body.

GabuEx

What would make it different, though? If one's consciousness is purely a product of one's physical body, then would the recreation of one's exact physical body not also recreate the exact same consciousness? Right now, you perceive yourself as a conscious entity in a body; if you went into this teleporter, what would be different such that that same consciousness would not be present in it as well? Where did "you" go in the process?

To all intents and purposes, you would appear at the other end in a physical and conscious form. The re-creation of the body would also include the re-creation of a consciousness with no discernible difference. In your experiment, the matter would get left behind - reduced to its atomic form. At the receiver, new material is used to construct information conveyed through the machine. So "you" in your reduced physical form would be at the transmitter and you - as constructed form new materials - with your consciousness would be at the receiver.

[QUOTE="RationalAtheist"]

Both new people would initially have exactly the same memories, experience and identity to start off with. They would both have identical singular independent consciousnesses, but their shared experience would stop at the transmission of the facsimile. It would diverge from there on in.

GabuEx

But I'm not sure if this is addressing the root issue that this thought experiment is getting at. As I said, right now you perceive yourself as a conscious entity in a body, and typically atheists will say that that is simply a product of one's physical body. Why, then, would "you" not also inhabit the other body, if indeed it is physically identical? If consciousness is simply a product of one's physical body, then what creates the difference that makes them independent consciousnesses? This thought experiment's purpose is largely to investigate the real nature and essence of what consciousness truly is and is not, and I feel that this may be getting lost in the details along the way.

I'm trying to answer as honestly as I think possible about what I genuinely believe would happen.

I think you would also inhabit the other body as a separate, but similar, consciousness. It seems logical that, if a consciousness is a super-set of receptors, experience, awareness, impulses, knowledge, belief, decision-making and emotion, etc, then it would all be particular to one human nervous system.

Why not think that two identical individuals with the same experience and views could be the result of copying? Why couldn't 2 consciousnesses not be the result of duplicating one consciousness? Why does this view diverge with the thrust of the thought experiment? I feel like I've failed, but don't know why.

[QUOTE="RationalAtheist"]

There would be no discernible difference between the facsimile and the original, so the only differentiators would be time lived, method of origin, and the originality of the materials used in copying. I used "real" to infer original and didn't mean to imply that one version had any more significance.

GabuEx

Right, but my point is that one's origin and actual time lived are more or less irrelevant in terms of the actual physical state of the body. If "you" would identifiably perceive yourself as a conscious individual in one but not both of the bodies, despite their being physically identical, then the question is why - what is different between the two that would cause the consciousnesses too be different even at the moment that both regain consciousness?

I believe its that as a human, I only have the ability for one physical consciousness. If there were two of me, we'd be independent thinkers, both separately conscious (surprised and horrified). We would both probably think the same thing at the same time immediately after the duplication, but as our perspective and experience differ, so our consciousnesses would develop down their own paths.

[QUOTE="RationalAtheist"]

What do you think yourself, Gabu?

GabuEx

Right, my apologies, I suppose I should have answered these questions myself as well.

Well, to be honest I don't really know, which is kind of a boring answer, but it's basically nonetheless the truth. Based on thoughts such as the ones in this thread, I tend to believe that there is more to consciousness than one's physical body, which to me would indicate that the answer would be that scenario A would be undetermined and that in scenarios B and C "you" would inhabit the same body you've always inhabited, since the new body, although physically identical, would lack an identical source of consciousness (whatever that source may be). If I believed that consciousness was entirely determined by one's physical body, though, then I feel that I would have great difficulty answering any of these questions, which is why I was interested to see others' responses who do believe that.

I'm not sure I understand the difficulty in answering the questions. I'm worried its gone over my head. Are you saying that an individual can not be cloned because a source of consciousness can not be found?

Well, to be honest I don't really know, which is kind of a boring answer, but it's basically nonetheless the truth.  Based on thoughts such as the ones in this thread, I tend to believe that there is more to consciousness than one's physical body

 

GabuEx

And if there is more to it than the body then why does it take a new born so long to develop a self-conscious state?

Cool topic Gabu. I'll give my two cents.

I'm a functionalist so I emphasize that consciousness and other various mental states are not physical states but processes that are carried out by physical states. Just like most other functions, mental states are multiply realizable. That is to say they can be performed simultaneously by different entities in different locations.

Probably though the important thing is to go over how personal identity relates to these mental processes. Personal identity, the self, "I" or whatever you want to call it is a label. It's not an objective thing but a way for a conscious entity to classify his (and others') thoughts, experiences and feelings under the heading of "me" or "him".

Given that we can't say that "you" are your physical body. We must instead say that "you" is a label attributed to the appropriate functioning of a physical system (the brain in this case).

Now as it happens this understanding of identity isn't exclusive to personhood, it applies to pretty much any function that a physical system carries out. Take a video game disc, say a blu-ray copy of GTA 4. The disc itself isn't GTA 4 but when you put it in a PS3 and play it the functional output is GTA 4. Moreover my friend's disc which carries out the same function is also GTA 4, the label applies equally even to separate physical systems.

Since the same understanding applies I'll first answer your scenario as if you were talking about GTA 4 and then go on to personal identity. That way we can see how labels apply to something which has many copies in reality and then to the less intuitive scenario of having many copies of a person.

Scenario A

So I'm sitting at home and playing some GTA 4 on the playstation and all of a sudden my console, game disc and TV are all destroyed, removed and instantly replaced with an exact replica. Presuming that the transition is instantaneous I wouldn't notice that I now have a physically different (note; not qualitatively different as it still has the same properties and functions) console, disc and TV and I would be playing the very same game of GTA 4 that I was a moment ago.

The label that I apply to my session of GTA 4 carries across these two functionally equivalent systems. It must be noted though that my previous physical copy has indeed been destroyed. It's of little consequence to me as the person playing the game though. Nevertheless the history of the first physical copy is that it was playing and then all of a sudden stopped playing.

Now same thing but with me as I walk through the teleporter. My physical body is destroyed in the teleporter and an exactly functional equivalent walks out at the receiver. This copy is indeed me and I would say "so I walked into the teleporter and all of a sudden I found myself here at the receiver. Wow this is great". That is the perspective of the second me though, for the first it is different. The first me would have walked into the receiver, gotten deconstructed, ceased to function and then died.

Given that, I'm a little wary of using such a machine that deconstructs my body before teleporting it. It's almost like suicide.

Just as a more vivid illustration of why I'm wary I'll propose scenario A-2. In this scenario the person walking into the teleporter isn't deconstructed but subject to prolonged torture while the person walking out of the reciever is treated well. If you asked the second person what the experience was like he would say "oh the process is very easy and hassle free, you just walk in and walk out." The first person would have an altogether different version and he would say "oh it was awful no-one should do it".

It's the same person giving the opinion each time but it does matter that they've had different experiences.

Scenario B

Myself and a friend both go to a games store and pick up a copy of GTA 4. He plays it a certain way, perhaps choosing to kill Playboy rather than Dwayne and I play it another way. Are we both playing GTA 4? Yes, of course we are. It's the same game, just played through in different fashions.

This time I walk into the teleporter and a clone of me walks out at the receiver. Both people can be labeled as the same "me" yet as they now occupy separate physical bodies their experiences, attitudes etc will will begin to diverge. In short the label of personal identity applies to both the original and the copy, even when they are in different locations doing different things.

Let's add another scenario to make this more easily understood. In scenario B-2 I buy a lottery ticket. Two possible things can happen from here, I could either win the jackpot, or not win it. In the first possible world where I win the lottery I retain my personal identity. Why wouldn't I be the same person? In the second possible world where I don't win I still retain my personal identity. Again why wouldn't I? Despite the fact that I would be doing very different things in very different locations across each possible world the label of personhood still applies in both cases. The same is true I think where both copies of me exist in the same possible world.

Scenario C

I'm playing some GTA 4 when I decide to turn of the console and have a break. An hour later I turn the console back on and start up anoither game and at the same instant my friend does the same. Which game is GTA 4? They obviously both are.

I'm rendered unconscious in a stasis machine and while in this state an exact copy of me is made and placed in another stasis machine. We awake at the same time and both are identified as "me".

Anway if all of that was a tl;dr here is the main bullet point that I am trying to make. Personal identity is not some monolithic, indivisible substance that can only reside in one physical body at a time. It's a label, a mental construct that applies to however many physical systems function in a way typical of a particular person.

Also just in case anyone feels like asking whether or not the consciousness of an original is the same as the consciousness of a clone, consider the same question in relation to a video game. Is my game of GTA 4 the same that my friend is playing? Well they are seperate physical systems obviously. An input from my controller will not yield an output on my friends TV screen and the games will play differently. Nevertheless they are both GTA 4.

Wrap your head around that and then consider the issue of an identical consciousness across different bodies.