What are the weakest cases for theism?

pray tell, what is wrong with assuming that it is possible for a maximally great being to exist? After all, there is nothing internally contradictory about a maximally great being, and possible worlds semantics includes all descriptions of reality which are METAPHYSICALLY possible, as in not inherently self-contradictory. It would seem that the Atheist has quite a burden of proof to attain to if he wishes to doubt that it is even possible for God to exist. danwallacefan

Well, see, here's the thing.  In most cases, to prove that "it is possible for X to exist" means that the person must only formulate at least one world in which X exists that is not logically inconsistent.  But here is the problem: in Plantinga's argument, the definition of this maximally great being includes the notion that it must exist in every possible world - that is to say, that it is impossible for there to be a world in which it does not exist.  Because, if a being did not even exist in a world, it surely could not be omnipotent and omniscient in that world.

Thus, it is not atheists who must prove that this being's existence is impossible, but rather it is theists who must prove that it is impossible for this being not to exist.  If there is even one possible world in which this being does not exist, then it can be concluded that the existence of this maximally great being (as defined by Plantinga) is impossible.

[QUOTE="danwallacefan"]pray tell, what is wrong with assuming that it is possible for a maximally great being to exist? After all, there is nothing internally contradictory about a maximally great being, and possible worlds semantics includes all descriptions of reality which are METAPHYSICALLY possible, as in not inherently self-contradictory. It would seem that the Atheist has quite a burden of proof to attain to if he wishes to doubt that it is even possible for God to exist. GabuEx

Well, see, here's the thing. In most cases, to prove that "it is possible for X to exist" means that the person must only formulate at least one world in which X exists that is not logically inconsistent. But here is the problem: in Plantinga's argument, the definition of this maximally great being includes the notion that it must exist in every possible world - that is to say, that it is impossible for there to be a world in which it does not exist. Because, if a being did not even exist in a world, it surely could not be omnipotent and omniscient in that world.

Thus, it is not atheists who must prove that this being's existence is impossible, but rather it is theists who must prove that it is impossible for this being not to exist. If there is even one possible world in which this being does not exist, then it can be concluded that the existence of this maximally great being (as defined by Plantinga) is impossible.

GabuEx, that is what the argument sets out to prove. So long as a maximally great being exists in SOME possible world, it HAS to exist in every possible world. It would be rendered a logically necessary truth. 2=2 is a logically necessary truth. There is no world in which 2=3. The Atheist would have to know that God does not exist in any possible world in order to say that God does not exist. Unless he can do that, God exists. danwallacefan

Logical Assumption No1 states THIS

Logical (in terms of the first assumption) Assumption No2 states THE SAME THING.

But two assumptions that agree, even if they seem logical, they don't prove anything.

This argument is a wordplay and a tragical one, that is based on the elasticity of some terms and the limitations in human fantasy, or rather the superfluous use of it. ;)

Honestly, from the first time I saw this argument, till now, I still think it's nonsense, sorry. :|

GabuEx, that is what the argument sets out to prove. So long as a maximally great being exists in SOME possible world, it HAS to exist in every possible world. It would be rendered a logically necessary truth. 2=2 is a logically necessary truth. There is no world in which 2=3. The Atheist would have to know that God does not exist in any possible world in order to say that God does not exist. Unless he can do that, God exists. danwallacefan

I'll have to admit I don't quite have the historically philosophical backing the two of you seem to have on the subject, but if I might interject a bit anyway.

I need to replace the utterly subjective and as far as I can tell contextually meaningless word "great" with "powerful" (if this isn't what we are talking about please let me know.)

But if we accept there are other possible worlds (which while I find the idea fascinating and interesting to talk about, I don't find it ultimately convincing) is it not possible that this most powerful being in one world could be held at bay or even destroyed by a team of almost as powerful beings.  The process repeats until the left over most powerful being isn't really that worthy of the god status.  If we accept this, is there even any need to have the killing off, can't that most powerful, still be so impotent or ignorant as to not deserve such title? 

[QUOTE="GabuEx"]

[QUOTE="danwallacefan"]pray tell, what is wrong with assuming that it is possible for a maximally great being to exist? After all, there is nothing internally contradictory about a maximally great being, and possible worlds semantics includes all descriptions of reality which are METAPHYSICALLY possible, as in not inherently self-contradictory. It would seem that the Atheist has quite a burden of proof to attain to if he wishes to doubt that it is even possible for God to exist. danwallacefan

Well, see, here's the thing. In most cases, to prove that "it is possible for X to exist" means that the person must only formulate at least one world in which X exists that is not logically inconsistent. But here is the problem: in Plantinga's argument, the definition of this maximally great being includes the notion that it must exist in every possible world - that is to say, that it is impossible for there to be a world in which it does not exist. Because, if a being did not even exist in a world, it surely could not be omnipotent and omniscient in that world.

Thus, it is not atheists who must prove that this being's existence is impossible, but rather it is theists who must prove that it is impossible for this being not to exist. If there is even one possible world in which this being does not exist, then it can be concluded that the existence of this maximally great being (as defined by Plantinga) is impossible.

GabuEx, that is what the argument sets out to prove. So long as a maximally great being exists in SOME possible world, it HAS to exist in every possible world. It would be rendered a logically necessary truth. 2=2 is a logically necessary truth. There is no world in which 2=3. The Atheist would have to know that God does not exist in any possible world in order to say that God does not exist. Unless he can do that, God exists. danwallacefan

I don't think you're understanding what I'm saying. Look at how Plantinga defines "maximal excellence" and then "maximal greatness":

"A being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in W."

Certainly a being cannot be omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good in W if it does not exist in W, so there is an implicit statement here that a being with maximal excellence in W must exist in W.

"A being has maximal greatness if it has maximal excellence in every possible world."

Since a being can only have maximal excellence in a world W if it exists in world W, the definition of maximal greatness implicitly carries with it the statement that a being with maximal greatness must exist in every possible world.

Then, we come to the crux of the matter - the fundamental assumption in the argument:

"Maximal greatness is possibly exemplified. That is, it is possible that there be a being that has maximal greatness."

This assumption asserts that it is possible for a being to be maximally great - and this carries with it the assertion that it is possible for a being to exist in every possible world. And this is the fundamental problem I am bringing to light: if we can even create one single possible world in which this being does not exist, then this being does not have maximal greatness. Thus, in order to prove that this assumption is true, it is necessary to prove that it is impossible for this being not to exist in a possible world - that is, it must be proven that this being is a necessary being such that a world cannot exist without this being existing.

Therefore, in order to prove that this argument is sound, it is necessary to first prove that this being is a necessary being - but that is precisely what this argument is trying to show in the first place!

Therefore, this argument gets us absolutely nowhere. It only proves that if this being is a necessary being, then this being is a necessary being - a complete tautology.

Plantinga's ontological argument for the non-existence of God

P1: It is possible that a maximally great being does not exist.

P2: If it is possible for a maximally great being to not exist, then a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world.

P3: If a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world, then it does not exist in every possible world

P4: If a maximally great being does not exist in every possible world, then a maximally great being does not exist in the actual world

P5: If a maximally great being does not exist in the actual world, then it does not exist

C: Therefore, a maximally great being does not exist

Plantinga's ontological argument for the non-existence of God

P1: It is possible that a maximally great being does not exist.

P2: If it is possible for a maximally great being to not exist, then a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world.

P3: If a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world, then it does not exist in every possible world

P4: If a maximally great being does not exist in every possible world, then a maximally great being does not exist in the actual world

P5: If a maximally great being does not exist in the actual world, then it does not exist

C: Therefore, a maximally great being does not exist

domatron23

Yup. There is actually one interesting conclusion from Plantinga's argument, which is that the existence of a maximally great being is either a logical necessity or a logical impossiblity; there is no middle ground. This makes sense, since the very definition of a maximally great being relies on its existing in every world (i.e., on its being a necessary being). But the argument certainly does not determine which is the case.

For me, the argument that individuals who believe in God are happier than those who do not. This argument is invalid for several reasons, (1) happiness does not equate righteousness any more than being drunk and having sex does, (2) most religions support the persecution of adherents so that they may achieve eternal happiness after death which thus contradicts the argument, and (3) you don't know me, I don't know you, I have a different way of showing happiness than you do and despite my serious overtones, there are a lot in life that I enjoy. Can I say that I enjoy it more than anyone else? Of course I can't, because I don't know how much you enjoy firstly, and second of all, the enjoyment of life isn't properly suited for competition. How ridiculous would it be if people went around complaining that they enjoy life more than anyone else?

Furthermore, there's also the rebuttal to the many Gods argument, and whenever someone invokes that the Abrahamic God is powerful and thus the only one that matters, I try to sarcastically outdo them, and invoke my own Goddess and say that "My Goddess is greater than your God" to logically show how invalid their argument is. It's funny too, because they disagree with my assertion, yet I'm making the same assertion that they're making.

Genetic_Code

In response to GebuEx, Plantinga's argument need only assume that God, if he exists, exists necessarily. Now the Atheist can say that God exists in no possible worlds. But the only way he could do this would be to somehow show that God is inherently self-contradictory. Until then, it is not possible, metaphysically, for God not to exist. The ontological argument PROVES that there are no possible worlds in which God does not exist.

Now in response to Domatron:
P1 is only epistemically true, not metaphysically true. God is metaphysically necessary, but not epistemically necessary (there could be some as-of-yet undiscovered flaw in the Ontological argument)

I'm not sure how P2 follows from P1

Now I know that P3 doesn't follow from P2. As a theist, I can back up P3 of Plantinga's argument because a maximally great being is only maximally great if it is necessary. However, nothing about existing in no possible worlds makes this maximally great being actually greater.

In response to GebuEx, Plantinga's argument need only assume that God, if he exists, exists necessarily. Now the Atheist can say that God exists in no possible worlds. But the only way he could do this would be to somehow show that God is inherently self-contradictory. Until then, it is not possible, metaphysically, for God not to exist. The ontological argument PROVES that there are no possible worlds in which God does not exist.

Now in response to Domatron:
P1 is only epistemically true, not metaphysically true. God is metaphysically necessary, but not epistemically necessary (there could be some as-of-yet undiscovered flaw in the Ontological argument)

I'm not sure how P2 follows from P1

Now I know that P3 doesn't follow from P2. As a theist, I can back up P3 of Plantinga's argument because a maximally great being is only maximally great if it is necessary. However, nothing about existing in no possible worlds makes this maximally great being actually greater.

danwallacefan

In response to GebuEx, Plantinga's argument need only assume that God, if he exists, exists necessarily. Now the Atheist can say that God exists in no possible worlds. But the only way he could do this would be to somehow show that God is inherently self-contradictory. Until then, it is not possible, metaphysically, for God not to exist. The ontological argument PROVES that there are no possible worlds in which God does not exist.

danwallacefan

One of Plantinga's premises for his version of the ontological argument is that it is possible for a being to exist which has maximal greatness. This means that he has assumed as a premise in the argument that it is possible for a being to exist in every possible world. But since "possibly necessary" is equivalent to "necessary", this is precisely what the argument is trying to show. He has thus assumed the intended conclusion in his premises, making the argument totally circular. The only thing that it proves is that if there exists a being with maximal greatness, then there exists a being with maximal greatness; it does not actually show that such a being exists.

The only thing that the argument shows is that a necessary being is either necessary or impossible. But that's kind of a "duh" thing to say, given that that fact can be obtained purely through the definition of a necessary being. The burden of proof for possibility is much higher for a necessary being than a contingent being. To prove that a contingent being is possible, you must only construct a single possible world in which that being exists - the burden of proof is thus on those claiming the contrary to examine all possible worlds and show why in none of them can this being exist.

To prove that a necessary being is possible, however, you must show that there cannot exist a world in which that being does not exist. Thus, it is on the people claiming the possibility of the necessary being this time to examine all possible worlds and show why in none of them can this being not exist. You cannot simply assume there is a possibility until proven otherwise when it comes to a necessary being. Even looking at our world, a world we know in extreme detail, it is not exactly obvious why there must be a necessary being in it, and if there is no necessary being in even one world, then there is no necessary being in any world, and thus there is no necessary being, full stop.

In effect, in order to prove that this necessary being exists in all worlds, one would have to prove that it exists in our world, and then the entire argument is pointless because the end result - the existence of this being in our world - would already have been proven.

Another issue is that, if you really look at the argument, it has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with the definition of "maximal excellence" (which is what Plantinga uses to refer to omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence). It does not make use of that definition in any way. Thus, we could also define a being with "maximal excellence" in a possible world W to mean "a being that is powerless, that knows nothing, and that is wholly evil". The argument is identical, and hey presto, we've proven (if we take the argument as a sound one) that there necessarily exists in every world a being that is powerless, that knows nothing, and that is wholly evil.

Really, the whole bit about "maximal greatness" is fully and totally superfluous. All the argument is proving is that a necessary being is necessary, which is, well, obvious.

In response to teenaged: Your post was laden with assertions

In response to GabuEx, your argument was likewise laden with assertions. You really only assert that the standard of proof for proving hte possibility of a necessarily existent entity is higher on the basis that the conclusion inevitably and instantaneously follows from the premise. Now until you can show some sort of inherent self-contradiction in the notion of a maximally great being, or God for that matter, we have no reason to assume hte impossibility of a maximally great being. Further, the notion that a maximally great being is logically impossible IS A POSITIVE CLAIM TO KNOWLEDGE, It is NOT the default position. Finally, The problem with the concept of a maximally great being is solved by Philosopher of Religion Bill Craig. As Bill Craig notes, there are problems with the notion of a quasi-maximally great being

[quote=Bill Craig]My argument against such a parody is that any reason for thinking a quasi-maximally great being is possible also warrants belief in the possibility of a maximally great being, but if we think that a maximally great being is possible, then we must say that a quasi-maximally great being is impossible after all, since it's impossible for the two to co-exist in the same world.

In response to GabuEx, your argument was likewise laden with assertions. You really only assert that the standard of proof for proving hte possibility of a necessarily existent entity is higher on the basis that the conclusion inevitably and instantaneously follows from the premise. Now until you can show some sort of inherent self-contradiction in the notion of a maximally great being, or God for that matter, we have no reason to assume hte impossibility of a maximally great being. Further, the notion that a maximally great being is logically impossible IS A POSITIVE CLAIM TO KNOWLEDGE, It is NOT the default position. Finally, The problem with the concept of a maximally great being is solved by Philosopher of Religion Bill Craig. As Bill Craig notes, there are problems with the notion of a quasi-maximally great being

[quote="Bill Craig"]My argument against such a parody is that any reason for thinking a quasi-maximally great being is possible also warrants belief in the possibility of a maximally great being, but if we think that a maximally great being is possible, then we must say that a quasi-maximally great being is impossible after all, since it's impossible for the two to co-exist in the same world. danwallacefan

You're not getting what I'm saying. I'm not saying that the conclusion follows from the premise. I'm saying that the conclusion is the premise. That means that Plantinga has begged the question, a clear logical fallacy that results in an argument that is wholly tautological.

As for why a necessary being is harder to prove than a contingent being, it's really quite simple:

Contingent being

Argument in favor: Needs only one possible world - the world in which the being exists.
Argument against: Needs all possible worlds - must show that in none of them does the being exist.

Necessary being

Argument in favor: Needs all possible worlds - must show that in none of them does the being not exist.
Argument against: Needs only one possible world - the world in which the being does not exist.

As you can see, the effort needed to prove the existence of a necessary being is the exact same as the effort needed to disprove a contingent being. Thus, the roles are completely reversed. It is not I who must show that this being is impossible; it is you who must show that it is possible. You would be correct if we were discussing a contingent being, but we are not.

Plantinga's ontological argument for the non-existence of God

P1: It is possible that a maximally great being does not exist.

P2: If it is possible for a maximally great being to not exist, then a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world.

P3: If a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world, then it does not exist in every possible world

P4: If a maximally great being does not exist in every possible world, then a maximally great being does not exist in the actual world

P5: If a maximally great being does not exist in the actual world, then it does not exist

C: Therefore, a maximally great being does not exist

domatron23

In response to Domatron:
P1 is only epistemically true, not metaphysically true. God is metaphysically necessary, but not epistemically necessary (there could be some as-of-yet undiscovered flaw in the Ontological argument)danwallacefan

Yeah you're going to have to put that in laymans terms for me. I don't think that I've taken as many philosophy courses as you.

Are you saying that a possible description of the world where a maximally great being does not exist is logically incoherent?

I'm not sure how P2 follows from P1danwallacefan

I just copy/pasted your own argument from the ontological argument thread and replaced "exists" with "does not exist". If you want justification for premise two then you can reread your own words.

Before I begin my breif discussion, I feel that it is necessary to go over something known to philosophers as "Possible worlds semantics" because if you dont understand this concept, then I feel this argument will go WAY over your head, as it did mine the first time I heard a defense of the argument. a Possible world is a possible description of reality, a description which is not inherently self-contradictory or illogical (violating rules of logic or mathematics). Now if something exists contingently, or if something is true contingently, then it is true in one or more possible worlds, but it is not true in every possible world. danwallacefan

All I'm doing here is using Plantinga's logic to come to the opposite conclusion of the original argument. If you want to undermine the logic at use then you will be undermining yourself.

Now I know that P3 doesn't follow from P2. As a theist, I can back up P3 of Plantinga's argument because a maximally great being is only maximally great if it is necessary. However, nothing about existing in no possible worlds makes this maximally great being actually greater.

danwallacefan

Again this is just the same logic being thrown back at you. Premise three follows from premise two because the definition of a maximally great being involves its necessity. You said it yourself:

Entailed in maximal greatness is necessity. a necessary entity cannot possibly exist in only one or a few possible worlds and not in others, that is inherently self-contradictorydanwallacefan

A maximally great being can't exist in one possible world and not exist in another therefore, given premise one, a maximally great being does not exist in every possible world. This is the exact same kind of logic that you used before.

In response to teenaged: Your post was laden with assertions

---danwallacefan

So how was it concluded that maximal power, maximal intelligence, and maximal goodness must reside in one being, and those are the traits of god?

You might as well say, people vary in smelliness but we can make the comparison only by reference to a perfect maximum of conceivable smelliness. Therefore there must exist a pre-eminently peerless stinker, and we call him GodDawkins

More seriously, if there were a god and maximal goodness is one of his traits, isn't it abundantly clear this god does not exist as any of the traditional religious variations.

[QUOTE="danwallacefan"]

In response to teenaged: Your post was laden with assertions

---Teenaged

[QUOTE="Teenaged"][QUOTE="danwallacefan"]

In response to teenaged: Your post was laden with assertions

---Funky_Llama

[QUOTE="Funky_Llama"][QUOTE="Teenaged"][QUOTE="danwallacefan"]

In response to teenaged: Your post was laden with assertions

---Teenaged

[QUOTE="Teenaged"][QUOTE="Funky_Llama"][QUOTE="Teenaged"][QUOTE="danwallacefan"]

In response to teenaged: Your post was laden with assertions

---Funky_Llama

[QUOTE="Funky_Llama"][QUOTE="Teenaged"][QUOTE="Funky_Llama"][QUOTE="Teenaged"][QUOTE="danwallacefan"]

In response to teenaged: Your post was laden with assertions

---Teenaged

Yep, there's a difference. As for agreeing with you - your post did make assertions, yes. But there's nothing wrong with asserting things whatsoever.Funky_Llama

in response to GebuEx, It seems like you never actually read my argument. As I noted earlier, you never gave a reason to say that the possibility of the existence of a necessary being needs a higher standard of proof. You never gave support for your contention that we need to examine all possible worlds to conclude the existence of a necessary being. But that seems silly on the account that we know that some things are necessarily true (2+2=4, Bachelors are unmarried) even though we have not examined very many possible worlds at all. Furthermore, you ignored my point about the impossibility of God's existence being a positive claim to knowledge. The Ontological argument first assumes the definition of God as a maximally great entity, which entails necessary existence. It then argues from the contingency to the necessary existence of such a being. Contingency is the DEFAULT POSITION.

Now in response to Domatron, your argument is response to the Ontological argument is deliciously absurd on two points
1: all parodies of the ontological argument don't actually address the soundness of the argument. The premises are still true, and the conclusion still follows from the premises. This alone should give us doubt as to the cogency of these parodies of the Ontological argument until this shows a formal logical problem in the arguments

2: Non-existence is not a property (existence may not be a property either, but I am tempted to contest Kant's notion that existence is not a property). Thus, something cannot be greater for not existing in some possible world. Plantinga's argument argues that a maximally great being must exist in all possible worlds because it can be greater by existing necessarily rather than contingently. But your logic simply will not due here because non-existence is not, I must stress, a property. Only existing things have properties. to recap, there's nothing about necessary non-existence that makes something greater than a contingent entity.

This argument is a wordplay and a tragical one, that is based on the elasticity of some terms and the limitations in human fantasy, or rather the superfluous use of it. ;)

Honestly, from the first time I saw this argument, till now, I still think it's nonsense, sorry. :|

Teenaged

Are you referring to this post Teenaged?

I thought it was perfectly fine and I agree 100%

[QUOTE="Teenaged"]

This argument is a wordplay and a tragical one, that is based on the elasticity of some terms and the limitations in human fantasy, or rather the superfluous use of it. ;)

Honestly, from the first time I saw this argument, till now, I still think it's nonsense, sorry. :|

domatron23

Are you referring to this post Teenaged?

I thought it was perfectly fine and I agree 100%

Now in response to Domatron, your argument is response to the Ontological argument is deliciously absurd on two points
1: all parodies of the ontological argument don't actually address the soundness of the argument. The premises are still true, and the conclusion still follows from the premises. This alone should give us doubt as to the cogency of these parodies of the Ontological argument until this shows a formal logical problem in the arguments

2: Non-existence is not a property (existence may not be a property either, but I am tempted to contest Kant's notion that existence is not a property). Thus, something cannot be greater for not existing in some possible world. Plantinga's argument argues that a maximally great being must exist in all possible worlds because it can be greater by existing necessarily rather than contingently. But your logic simply will not due here because non-existence is not, I must stress, a property. Only existing things have properties. to recap, there's nothing about necessary non-existence that makes something greater than a contingent entity.

danwallacefan

1. If an argument can be shown to produce a false or contradictory conclusion then you can know automatically that there is something wrong with the premises or the validity of the argument. In this case my version of the argument has produced a conclusion (the maximal being exists in no possible worlds) that is mutually exclusive to yours (the maximal being exists in every possible world) which means that either one of us has slipped up or that the argument itself is bupkiss. Lets call your version of Plantinga's ontological argument A1 and mine A2. Now the only difference that I can note between A1 and A2 is premise 1. A1 postulates the possibility of a maximally great being's existence A2 postualtes the possibility of a maximally great being's non-existence.

Your argument against the first premise of A2 seems to amount to: "the first premise of A2 is false because the conclusion of A1 is true and contradicts it" or: "It's impossible for God to not exist in some possible world because God exists in every possible world as established by the ontological argument".

This is question begging though, the whole point of A2 is to challenge the conclusion of A1. Lets make a comparison, say that I was trying to challenge a literal account of Genesis by bringing up evidence for an old earth. If my opponent replied "An old earth is false because a literal account of Genesis is true" then I would be justified in calling him a fool. Unfortunately though you're doing the same thing when you say that A2 is false because A1 is true. You're using the idea on trial to refute the argument against it.

Think of it this way. Pretend that the ontological argument had originally been thought up by Dawkins as a disproof of God and pretend that he presented it as in A2 with the conclusion: "a maximally great being does not exist in reality". Imagine yourself saying to him: "But what if we postulate a possible world where a maximally great being does exist? Wouldn't that produce a conclusion where that maximally great being exists in reality". Dawkins could well answer in the fashion that you did "what a deliciously absurd idea well A2 is sound therefore A1 is false neener neener neener".

Don't pretend like you wouldn't be pissed off with that kind of rhetoric.

Now either the first premise of A1 is true or the first premise of A2 is true but the argument offers no way to determine which one it is. The arguments just end up in a stalemate.

2. I think you're mixing up definitions and reality here. The definition of Plantinga's maximally great being is omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence and necessary existence (correct me if I'm wrong there). The point of the ontological argument is to try and convince us that something in reality matches that definition. Just because the definition of something involves its existence does not mean that it exists. I could define water-oranges as a fruit with the properties of water-melons and oranges and existence but I'll be damned if a water-orange exists in reality.

in response to GebuEx, It seems like you never actually read my argument. As I noted earlier, you never gave a reason to say that the possibility of the existence of a necessary being needs a higher standard of proof. You never gave support for your contention that we need to examine all possible worlds to conclude the existence of a necessary being. But that seems silly on the account that we know that some things are necessarily true (2+2=4, Bachelors are unmarried) even though we have not examined very many possible worlds at all. Furthermore, you ignored my point about the impossibility of God's existence being a positive claim to knowledge. The Ontological argument first assumes the definition of God as a maximally great entity, which entails necessary existence. It then argues from the contingency to the necessary existence of such a being. Contingency is the DEFAULT POSITION.

danwallacefan

A necessary being is, by definition, necessary. That means it must exist in every possible world. That means its disproof only needs one single possible world in which this being does not exist. That means that in order to show that this being possibly exists (and therefore that it does exist), it must be shown that there cannot exist a logically ocnsistent world in which this being does not exist. This is the exact same as disproving the existence of a contingent being: it must be shown that there cannot exist a logically consistent world in which this being exists.

If you don't understand this, there really is - no offense - nothing more that I can say. This entire argument I'm presenting depends on understanding this inherent difference between necessary and contingent beings.

I'll demonstrate the circularity of the ontological argument as well.

Premise 1 states that it's possible that a maximally great being exists. When you read it as just that it seems like a perfectly fair premise, after all most people will concede that even the most farfetched idea is at least possible (no matter how unlikely).

Premise 1 contains a load of connotations though. Given that a maximally great being is defined as necessary when you admit to its possible existence in one possible world you admit to its existence in all. The first premise of the ontological argument therefore can be reduce to the premise "a maximally great being exists in every possible world" and since reality is a possible world the first premise is realy just "a maximally great being exists in reality". So when you cut out all the bull and look at what Plantinga is really saying the argument turns into:

P1: A maximally great being exists in reality

Conclusion: Therefore a maximally great being exists in reality 

Which is text book circularity.

Not to be hypocritical though my version of the argument is equally circular and equally unsound.

Actually it looks like Gabu has already demonstrated the tautology, nevermind that last post.domatron23

Having people agree with something I said is always welcome; I tend to start thinking that I'm going crazy when I'm the only person who's saying something. :P

[QUOTE="domatron23"]Actually it looks like Gabu has already demonstrated the tautology, nevermind that last post.GabuEx

Having people agree with something I said is always welcome; I tend to start thinking that I'm going crazy when I'm the only person who's saying something. :P

Oh don't worry, your posts tend be very very easy to agree with.

Anyway putting the argument into one premise followed by an identical conclusion makes it nice and clear that the argument is circular so I guess my last post wasn't entirely a waste.

In response to GabuEx:

I am fully aware of the differences between a necessarily and a contingently existent being, and your arguments for the possibility of a necessarily existent entity are not convincing, they are mere assertions. You merely assert that we have to SHOW that God exists in every possible world before we can demonstrate his necessary existence. I want some reason that we should not accept premise 1 (the contingency of a necessary being, which leads inevitably to his necessity) on the fact that God is not inherently self-contradictory

Now in response to Domatron: What is wrong with adding necessary existence as a property of God? It would seem that we should render all language obsolete of we cannot call God a necessarily existent entity. Furthermore, as I noted before, your claim of circularity is false because your only basis for that is that the conclusion necessarily follows from the first premise. This does not, of course, make the argument circular. the premise "a maximally great being exists" needs to be one of the premises if you wish to say that the argument is circular.

Now in response to Domatron: What is wrong with adding necessary existence as a property of God? It would seem that we should render all language obsolete of we cannot call God a necessarily existent entity. Furthermore, as I noted before, your claim of circularity is false because your only basis for that is that the conclusion necessarily follows from the first premise. This does not, of course, make the argument circular. the premise "a maximally great being exists" needs to be one of the premises if you wish to say that the argument is circular.

danwallacefan

There's nothing wrong with defining something with any set of premises you wish. The problem comes when you try to say something about reality with nothing more than that definition. I defined the water-orange with existence before but that sure as hell doesn't make it existent. Remember definition=/=reality.

As for the circularity I'm not saying that the conclusion follows from the first premise, I'm saying that the first premise is the conclusion.

Whenever you use a word which has a set of properties associated with it you are automatically implyingall of those properties. If said to you that I am a bachelor I would also be saying that I am an unmarried man of marriagable age because the former is encapsulated within the latter. Here's an argument of the same form which goes in a circle and establishes nothing.

P1: btaylor2404 is a bachelor

P2: a bachelor is a unmarried man of marriageable age

C: Therefore btaylor2404 is an unmarried man of marriageable age

That seems like a fine enough argument but it's not actually saying anything that wasn't already encapsulated in premise 1 (which happens to be false). The argument is really just "btaylor is a bachelor therefore btaylor is a bachelor" which is circular, tautological and ridiculous. The same thing applies to the ontological argument. All that you are doing is offering one premise and then explaining what the definition of that premise implies.

Saying that a maximally great being is possible is saying that a maximally great being exists. It's the exact same thing that St Anselm did when he said that even a fool could imagine that God exists.

One argument for the existence of God which I have always found particularly poor is the alleged perfection of a holy book. Those kind of claims always boil down to "any part of scripture which is contradicted or falsified is not meant to be literal" or "God made it possible" or "you can't prove that a man can't survive in the stomach of a fish!" or "event X is true therefore the evidence that contradicts it must be false".

Here's a good read, dumb enough not to deserve its own thread.

FROM THE OREGONIAN
I could not help but notice all the coverage about the downtown shooting. All this coverage got me thinking -- the shooting was just a symptom of a much bigger problem. America lacks God.

America was once a godly nation. Times were better. People were safer. However, we have stepped away from God. We have let humanist views slip into our life****. This absence of God was one cause of the downtown shooting.

The young shooter did not know the God that I know. He was probably taught about evolution. He was probably influenced by atheism. This lack of God leads to dangerous things that even the strictest laws cannot prevent.

More gun laws may be a result of the shooting. Fewer gun laws may be a result. Whatever happens, we should consider adding God back to our lives.

RUSSELL MATHEWS
Milwaukie 

Oh, here are some additional self-defeating arguments.

A: Life is complex.
B: Life exists.
C: Therefore, God exists.

A: Evolution is complex.
B: Evolution couldn't have occured due to the complexity of it.
C: Therefore, evolution does not exist and God exists.

A: Every atheist I know is a bad person.
B: I try not to understand atheists because they're heathrens and I prefer to hang out with my drunk and high friends and pretend that God will protect us.
C: Therefore, God exists.

A: Atheism means "no hope".
B: There is such a thing as hope.
C: Therefore, God exists.

That last one was actually used against me just really recently. The person who used it against me was drunk at the time.

Here's another one.

A: Society talks about God.
B: Therefore, God exists.

A: Atheists exist.
B: Therefore, God exists.

"Lulz how can u beleave in evlution lol people didnt evolve frum monkys!!1!"

:roll:

"Lulz how can u beleave in evlution lol people didnt evolve frum monkys!!1!"

:roll:

helium_flash

"Lulz how can u beleave in evlution lol people didnt evolve frum monkys!!1!"

:roll:

helium_flash

Atheists can be just as irrational though, I hate to admit.

"Lulz how can u beleave in god lol people dont come from sum invizibul beeing". 

A: Atheists exist.
B: Therefore, God exists.

Genetic_Code

I'd decry this for being a straw man if it weren't for the numerous mind-rending posts I've seen along the lines of "You don't believe in Christianity! That proves the Bible is correct! (Bible verse)" :P

[QUOTE="helium_flash"]

"Lulz how can u beleave in evlution lol people didnt evolve frum monkys!!1!"

:roll:

Genetic_Code

Atheists can be just as irrational though, I hate to admit.

"Lulz how can u beleave in god lol people dont come from sum invizibul beeing".