Falsifying Falsificationism

I'd like to thank Wiley-Blackwell publishing group and David Papineau for the material I'm about to present.  

Before we start talking about falsifiability as it is used in science, we should talk about the problem of induction.

The problem of induction is best explained by example. When a scientist boils water and sees that water comes to a boil at 212º F, the scientist will probably conclude that he has discovered a law of nature, namely that all samples of water will always come to a boil at 212º F. But here's the problem noted by David Hume; at what point do we get to say that a certain amount of tests gurantees that there is a law? Or, more akin to Hume, how do we know that the "law" will not change in the future? This problem is rooted in the fact that we are trying to take a particular set of data and applying it to all things, or taking a particular and extrapolating that to a universal. This does not follow, of course. 

So, that being said, without some solution to the problem of induction, we really are not rationally justified to believe that the future will be the same as the past.

This is where falsifiability comes in. Karl Popper invented falsifiability as a means to overcome the problem of induction. Basically, science doesn't prove certain theories true, rather, Science is about DISproving theories, and we act as though theories which have not been falsified are "true". While widely believed within the natural sciences, falsifiability as a scientific tool is very controversial among Philosophers of Science. 

The foremost objection by Philosophers of Science is that Popper's falsificationism does nothing to solve the problem of induction, but rather, it redefines science and concedes the problem of induction. Popper's falsificationism only accounts for negative scientific knowledge. One counter-example can disprove a scientific theory. But it doesn't account for positive scientific knowledge, and this is what makes science important. In other words, Science is important because it informs us of true scientific theories. Opines Papineau "we can cure diseases and send people to the moon because we know that certain causes do always have certain results, not because we know that they do not." 

Let's argue by example, once again. If I jump out of a 10-story window, I have two options

(1) I will land on the ground and die, or be in much pain

(2) I will float away harmlessly

(1) assumes that the laws of nature will remain the same, but (2) does not. On popper's view, neither theory is more rational than the other. But something has gone HORRIBLY wrong here, OF COURSE we are more rational to believe (1) than (2)! Falsifiability cannot account for this, and therefore, as good scientists and philosophers, we must discard falsifiability 

And hey I suppose you could, say, respond to unanswered posts in the other thread you made.....

Just sayin...

>__>

And hey I suppose you could, say, respond to unanswered posts in the other thread you made.....

Just sayin...

>__>

Teenaged

[QUOTE="Teenaged"]

And hey I suppose you could, say, respond to unanswered posts in the other thread you made.....

Just sayin...

>__>

danwallacefan

If you planned to answer later then no problem by me.

What exactly do these philosophers of science propose as a replacement to falsifiability to solve the problem of induction?GabuEx

Philosophical arguments?

I think you falsified falsification falsely.

Objectivism distinguishes between "certainty" from induction and "necessary truths" from deduction. Certainlty does not guarantee future outomes, but is contextualised "absolute truth" within our current span of knowledge.

What exactly do these philosophers of science propose as a replacement to falsifiability to solve the problem of induction?GabuEx

I'm guessing it's something to do with the unchanging mind that the transcendental argument posits. Let me anticipate the argument.

1. We can be certain that if you jump out of a 10 story windoow you will fall to your death

2. Inductive reasoning does not give us this certainty

Therefore: We must appeal to the unchanging mind of a God in order to justify the consistent behaviour of the universe and our certainty of 1

I think that what I mentioned in your other thread bears repeating, the empiricist approach to epistemology doesn't ever arrive at absolute truths, only certain degrees of versimilitude (truthlikeliness) depending on how large the base of inductive reasoning is. The problem of induction is only a problem if your after absolute certainty but what's the use of false certainty?

But as for the problem in the way you present it how can you possibly say that it is just as rational to theorize that a person wil die from a ten story drop as it is to theorize that he will harmlessly float away? Death is far more rational because we have a huge inductive base of reasoning which suggests that gravity is always in effect and no inductve base at all to suggest that it sometimes stops working.

But of course no matter how large an inductive base is it doesn't gaurantee absolute certainty, which is why scientific theories aren't true they are only not falsified.

I think you falsified falsification falsely.

Objectivism distinguishes between "certainty" from induction and "necessary truths" from deduction. Certainlty does not guarantee future outomes, but is contextualised "absolute truth" within our current span of knowledge.

 

RationalAtheist

What he said.

I'm guessing it's something to do with the unchanging mind that the transcendental argument posits. Let me anticipate the argument.

1. We can be certain that if you jump out of a 10 story windoow you will fall to your death

2. Inductive reasoning does not give us this certainty

Therefore: We must appeal to the unchanging mind of a God in order to justify the consistent behaviour of the universe and our certainty of 1

I think that what I mentioned in your other thread bears repeating, the empiricist approach to epistemology doesn't ever arrive at absolute truths, only certain degrees of versimilitude (truthlikeliness) depending on how large the base of inductive reasoning is. The problem of induction is only a problem if your after absolute certainty but what's the use of false certainty?

But as for the problem in the way you present it how can you possibly say that it is just as rational to theorize that a person wil die from a ten story drop as it is to theorize that he will harmlessly float away? Death is far more rational because we have a huge inductive base of reasoning which suggests that gravity is always in effect and no inductve base at all to suggest that it sometimes stops working.

But of course no matter how large an inductive base is it doesn't gaurantee absolute certainty, which is why scientific theories aren't true they are only not falsified.

domatron23

Ah yes, the good old "I reject your reality and substitute my own" tactic.

...I have to admit, I don't think anything has made me hate philosophy as much as danwallacefan's threads. :P

falsified falsification falsely.

RationalAtheist

Oooh a tongue twister eh? :P

[QUOTE="RationalAtheist"]

falsified falsification falsely.

ghoklebutter

Oooh a tongue twister eh? :P

Yes, but there's something more fundamental philosophically going on here - What they're saying means they can't say what they mean:

i.e. that its wrong to say its wrong.

Mind-bending!

This response has been far and away the best response to the problem of induction in this thread, so everyone else you're probably not going to be receiving a response, at least not today.  

I'm guessing it's something to do with the unchanging mind that the transcendental argument posits. Let me anticipate the argument.

1. We can be certain that if you jump out of a 10 story windoow you will fall to your death

2. Inductive reasoning does not give us this certainty

Therefore: We must appeal to the unchanging mind of a God in order to justify the consistent behaviour of the universe and our certainty of 1domatron23

Well that's a little bit simplistic, but I guess you could try to use the problem of induction and arrive at the transcendental argument for God, but I do not wish to do so today, and others have done a much better job, like theologica37  

I think that what I mentioned in your other thread bears repeating, the empiricist approach to epistemology doesn't ever arrive at absolute truths, only certain degrees of versimilitude (truthlikeliness) depending on how large the base of inductive reasoning is. The problem of induction is only a problem if your after absolute certainty but what's the use of false certainty?domatron23

Well the problem, of course, is that induction, assuming the falsity of bayesianism (which you're appealing to now of course), means that not only are we not certain that the future will resemble the past, but that we COMPLETELY lack any rational basis to conclude that the future will resemble the past.  

But as for the problem in the way you present it how can you possibly say that it is just as rational to theorize that a person wil die from a ten story drop as it is to theorize that he will harmlessly float away? Death is far more rational because we have a huge inductive base of reasoning which suggests that gravity is always in effect and no inductve base at all to suggest that it sometimes stops working.

But of course no matter how large an inductive base is it doesn't gaurantee absolute certainty, which is why scientific theories aren't true they are only not falsified.

domatron23

I should take some time to point out that you did not save Popper's falsificationism.   

This response has been far and away the best response to the problem of induction in this thread, so everyone else you're probably not going to be receiving a response, at least not today.  

danwallacefan

How much time could it take to just say what these philosophers of science propose to replace falsification?

Do they only intend to smugly pooh-pooh falsification while proposing nothing that can better drive scientific advancement, or do they actually have something genuinely productive to contribute that would improve upon the scientific method?  I honestly want to know. 

How much time could it take to just say what these philosophers of science propose to replace falsification?GabuEx

I'm not presenting any alternate way of solving the problem of induction Gabu. 

Do they only intend to smugly pooh-pooh falsification while proposing nothing that can better drive scientific advancement, or do they actually have something genuinely productive to contribute that would improve upon the scientific method?  I honestly want to know. 

GabuEx

This response has been far and away the best response to the problem of induction in this thread, so everyone else you're probably not going to be receiving a response, at least not today.  

danwallacefan

*blushes again*

[QUOTE="domatron23"]I think that what I mentioned in your other thread bears repeating, the empiricist approach to epistemology doesn't ever arrive at absolute truths, only certain degrees of versimilitude (truthlikeliness) depending on how large the base of inductive reasoning is. The problem of induction is only a problem if you're after absolute certainty but what's the use of false certainty?danwallacefan

Well the problem, of course, is that induction, assuming the falsity of bayesianism (which you're appealing to now of course), means that not only are we not certain that the future will resemble the past, but that we COMPLETELY lack any rational basis to conclude that the future will resemble the past.

If we assume that our past experience of the behaviour of reality plays no part in our expected behaviour of reality in the future then yes I would have to agree that we would lack a rational basis on which to conclude that the future will resemble the past. I'm very interested in how you would discount past experience from rational justification though. As far as I can tell a lifetime of observing that gravity acts consistently on people falling out of wndows does indeed provide some form of rational justification for an expectation that the person in your example will die.

[QUOTE="domatron23"]But as for the problem in the way you present it how can you possibly say that it is just as rational to theorize that a person wil die from a ten story drop as it is to theorize that he will harmlessly float away? Death is far more rational because we have a huge inductive base of reasoning which suggests that gravity is always in effect and no inductve base at all to suggest that it sometimes stops working.

But of course no matter how large an inductive base is it doesn't gaurantee absolute certainty, which is why scientific theories aren't true they are only not falsified.

danwallacefan

It might be worth mentioning that I had no idea what bayesianism was when I wrote that, I had to look it up afterwards. If you make a thread specifically about bayesianism you might be addressing something that I wasn't trying to defend. I mean for example with bayesian probability you have to assign a prior probability to a proposition and then adjust that probability based on the relevant data (which in our case would be observations of the effects of gravity). I'm not 100% sure that you can assign a prior probability to any proposition though.

So I am interested in seeing how you would go about discounting inductive reasoning alltogether but just make sure you aren't knocking down a straw-man.

I should take some time to point out that you did not save Popper's falsificationism.

danwallacefan

Bugger. Let me try again.

The foremost objection by Philosophers of Science is that Popper's falsificationism does nothing to solve the problem of induction, but rather, it redefines science and concedes the problem of induction. Popper's falsificationism only accounts for negative scientific knowledge. One counter-example can disprove a scientific theory. But it doesn't account for positive scientific knowledge, and this is what makes science important. In other words, Science is important because it informs us of true scientific theories. Opines Papineau "we can cure diseases and send people to the moon because we know that certain causes do always have certain results, not because we know that they do not." danwallacefan

Am I right in saying that your criticism of falsificationism is that it doesn't allow science to make any positive claims to truth and knowledge and therefore doesn't account for its importance and usefulness?

If I am correct then I would simply say you're wrong. Falsificationism does allow for positive scientific claims that are very useful and very important it's just that those claims are only as strong as the inductive base of reasoning behind them. No scientist is going to say that their theories are infallible truths, no quite the opposite, they will say that their theories are falsifiable and that they could be wrong. These theories are important and useful however because they fit and explain all the observed evidence collected so far.

So no, falsificationism doesn't preclude science from being important.