Demolition of the presumption of atheism, using reformed epistemology

okay, there is no de jure objection with respect solely to warrant, but surely we can object to Odin on the grounds that it is not justified. If we can show that it isn't justified, then we aren't even close to saying that it can possibly be warranted.danwallacefan

In the first part of this stanza, you understood my point. In the latter part, you abandoned this understanding by painting "a person who doesn't want to believe still won't accept yoru argument" as somehow a problem when I never tried to get people to accept that God exists.danwallacefan

Well there's a very simple reason why the FSM isn't a properly basic belief. It is not incorrigible, it is not self-evident, and last and most important of all we do not form belief in the flying spaghetti monster like we form beliefs about the external world (Spontaneously under certain circumstances) danwallacefan

[QUOTE="Welkabonz"]But the beliefs of those who do not believe in your God have not been shown to have 'Warrant'.danwallacefan

Its very hard to use induction to establish over-arching epistemological principles cuz, you know, induction assumes such principles. I trust that by identify, you mean "Observe" correct? Well try again welkabonz because you just begged the question. In trying to prove that the external world exists with evidence, you assumed that we actually see the external world.

well how do we "know" that the external world exists? We know because belief in it is properly basic. Next time, try unpacking your arguments.

If you have not shown that belief in God has warrant then it is not properly basic, notconspiracy. Welkabonz

obviously with respect to warrant, but not with respect to justification.

A is A. Humans possess consciousness, which is the faculty that identifies.Welkabonz

How do you know?

That which it identifies is the external / real world. Welkabonz

How do you know?

This is an axiom; ontologically, you have to acknowledge it in order to disagree. Welkabonz

Oh my, I hope this is original and that you didn't get this from Lord Russel. 

The external world is not some axiom of logic. For all we know our minds could exhaust all reality. 

While you did not explicitly disagree with 'existence exists', this is the answer to your question "How do we know that the external world exists?". Welkabonz

Well obviously existence itself exists, but now you're just playing semantics. Perhaps I can be a bit more specific. 

how do we KNOW that our perceptual beliefs are true?

You indicated their validity by answering your own question.Welkabonz

I will answer to your previous post later or tomorrow cause its 1 am local time atm.

[QUOTE="Teenaged"]Also for the sake of clarification can you point out some other properly basic beliefs other than the belief in God?danwallacefan

"2+2=4"

"If P then Q. P, therefore Q"

In other words, is a belief in god as self evident as 2+2=4?

I will answer to your previous post later or tomorrow cause its 1 am local time atm.

[QUOTE="danwallacefan"]

[QUOTE="Teenaged"]Also for the sake of clarification can you point out some other properly basic beliefs other than the belief in God?Teenaged

"2+2=4"

"If P then Q. P, therefore Q"

In other words, is a belief in god as self evident as 2+2=4?

[QUOTE="Teenaged"]

I will answer to your previous post later or tomorrow cause its 1 am local time atm.

[QUOTE="danwallacefan"]

[QUOTE="Teenaged"]Also for the sake of clarification can you point out some other properly basic beliefs other than the belief in God?danwallacefan

"2+2=4"

"If P then Q. P, therefore Q"

In other words, is a belief in god as self evident as 2+2=4?

I have another question: is the belief of a child that a monster is hiding in the dark a properly basic belief?

[QUOTE="danwallacefan"][QUOTE="Teenaged"]

I will answer to your previous post later or tomorrow cause its 1 am local time atm.

[QUOTE="danwallacefan"]

[QUOTE="Teenaged"]Also for the sake of clarification can you point out some other properly basic beliefs other than the belief in God?Teenaged

"2+2=4"

"If P then Q. P, therefore Q"

In other words, is a belief in god as self evident as 2+2=4?

I have another question: is the belief of a child that a monster is hiding in the dark a properly basic belief?

And if the child forms belief in monsters under his bed spontaneously just like perceptual beliefs, then it is a properly basic belief with respect to justification. 

good thing children merely infer that monsters exist under their bead :P

[QUOTE="Teenaged"][QUOTE="danwallacefan"][QUOTE="Teenaged"]

I will answer to your previous post later or tomorrow cause its 1 am local time atm.

[QUOTE="danwallacefan"]

[QUOTE="Teenaged"]Also for the sake of clarification can you point out some other properly basic beliefs other than the belief in God?danwallacefan

"2+2=4"

"If P then Q. P, therefore Q"

In other words, is a belief in god as self evident as 2+2=4?

I have another question: is the belief of a child that a monster is hiding in the dark a properly basic belief?

And if the child forms belief in monsters under his bed spontaneously just like perceptual beliefs, then it is a properly basic belief with respect to justification. 

good thing children merely infer that monsters exist under their bead :P

[QUOTE="danwallacefan"][QUOTE="Teenaged"][QUOTE="danwallacefan"][QUOTE="Teenaged"]

I will answer to your previous post later or tomorrow cause its 1 am local time atm.

[QUOTE="danwallacefan"]

[QUOTE="Teenaged"]Also for the sake of clarification can you point out some other properly basic beliefs other than the belief in God?Teenaged

"2+2=4"

"If P then Q. P, therefore Q"

In other words, is a belief in god as self evident as 2+2=4?

I have another question: is the belief of a child that a monster is hiding in the dark a properly basic belief?

And if the child forms belief in monsters under his bed spontaneously just like perceptual beliefs, then it is a properly basic belief with respect to justification. 

good thing children merely infer that monsters exist under their bead :P

the factors determining our epistemic obligations are internal because only internal factors are actually accessible. You say that they are justified because they are "caused" in a way. Our belief in logic and mathematics isn't caused by these truths. Similarly, we are not justified in our perceptual beliefs because the external world causes these beliefs. danwallacefan

And this where my referense to causes comes in.

Arent those external factors the cause of the properly basic beliefs?

[QUOTE="Welkabonz"]This is an axiom; ontologically, you have to acknowledge it in order to disagree. danwallacefan

[QUOTE="danwallacefan"][QUOTE="Welkabonz"]This is an axiom; ontologically, you have to acknowledge it in order to disagree. ChiliDragon

[QUOTE="danwallacefan"]the factors determining our epistemic obligations are internal because only internal factors are actually accessible. You say that they are justified because they are "caused" in a way. Our belief in logic and mathematics isn't caused by these truths. Similarly, we are not justified in our perceptual beliefs because the external world causes these beliefs. Teenaged

no :|

To quote myself once again

 

This theory has been subjected to severe criticisms. First, a belief being caused by a certain truth is not sufficient for knowledge. In essence, states of affairs can cause beliefs, but in epistemically irrelevant ways.

Let's take a look at Smith. He is short, and he is a hypochondriac. Let's say that while working on his car, he suddenly grows tired, and so he goes inside and turns on the evening news where he learns about a disorder that makes people tired, and that this affects mostly short men. Suppose further that Smith does have this disorder. Smith concludes that he has this disorder. But he doesn't have knowledge because his belief was caused by his being a hypochondriac, not his disorder.

The second problem is that it is not necessary for knowledge. There are areas where we obviously have knowledge which are not caused by the state of affairs. For instance, we have knowledge of truths of mathematics, like 2+2=4, and truths of logic, like "If P then Q, P, therefore Q". But our knowledge of these truths isn't actually caused these truths, they are known simply be reflection.danwallacefan

And this where my referense to causes comes in.

Arent those external factors the cause of the properly basic beliefs?

danwallacefan

[QUOTE="ChiliDragon"][QUOTE="danwallacefan"][QUOTE="Welkabonz"]This is an axiom; ontologically, you have to acknowledge it in order to disagree. danwallacefan

obviously with respect to warrant, but not with respect to justification.

How do you know?

How do you know?

Oh my, I hope this is original and that you didn't get this from Lord Russel. The external world is not some axiom of logic. For all we know our minds could exhaust all reality.

Well obviously existence itself exists,

but now you're just playing semantics. Perhaps I can be a bit more specific. how do we KNOW that our perceptual beliefs are true?

and my point was that your method is absolutely invalid.

How can there be justification without evidence, mig_killer? Welkabonz

Simple: The belief could be properly basic. 

Because I identified it. Welkabonz

how do you know what you're identifying?

In order to identify, there must be something which is identified. Welkabonz

so how do you know that you're identifying aything?

What we identify is the external world.Welkabonz

How do you know?

Sartre spoke of 'reflective consciousness', and called it the only form of consciousness; it is when 'consciousness reflects upon itself'.That is how I know that my consciousness exists.Welkabonz

Obviously you can be aware of incorrigible foundations, but how do you know the truth of your perceptual beliefs?

When I reflect on something else that I sense, I am reflecting upon the external world. Welkabonz

How do you know you're sensing the external world?

That is how I know that the external world exists. Welkabonz

How?

It is the basis of logic -- to identify, there must be something to identify.Welkabonz

Why?

Incidentally, it follows from the Law of Identity... I believe Aristotle came up with that one. Welkabonz

Aristotle was a crap philosopher then :P This is nothing more than fallacies of equivocation and question-begging sophistry

Hence the axiom. Welkabonz

It does not follow that our perceptual beliefs are true of course. 

Induction and deduction.... Welkabonz

There's no deductive argument for the reliability of our perceptual beliefs, and induction assumes the reliability of our perceptual beliefs.

and the axiom that existence exists and The Law of Identity together form the basis of knowledge.  Yours leaves too much up to the unkowable, mig.Welkabonz

No, not really. Particularism solves the problem of skepticism by reducing perceptual beliefs to properly basic beliefs. 

If nothing exists, there can be no consciousness: a consciousness with nothing to be conscious of is a contradiction in terms. A consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms: before it could identify itself as consciousness, it had to be conscious of something. If that which you claim to perceive does not exist, what you possess is not consciousness."Welkabonz

If you truly think we cannot know that which we perceive, I think I know why you always argue for the necessity of the supernatural -- and why reason here is futile.Welkabonz

As per the quote above, reality is the "court of appeal" to disagreements and a contradiction indicates an error in thinking.Welkabonz

[QUOTE="Welkabonz"]As per the quote above, reality is the "court of appeal" to disagreements and a contradiction indicates an error in thinking.ChiliDragon

[QUOTE="ChiliDragon"][QUOTE="Welkabonz"]As per the quote above, reality is the "court of appeal" to disagreements and a contradiction indicates an error in thinking.Welkabonz

They may be caused, but this is irrelevant to whether the belief is justified. danwallacefan

Merely the fact that its spontaneous?

So if we are able to find contradictions in our observations and correct them without contradiction, we do know that our observations are factually correct? You said that we could find contradictions if and only if the observation is factually correct, so if we do then we must have made a correct observation.Welkabonz

[QUOTE="Welkabonz"]So if we are able to find contradictions in our observations and correct them without contradiction, we do know that our observations are factually correct? You said that we could find contradictions if and only if the observation is factually correct, so if we do then we must have made a correct observation.ChiliDragon

If you have nothing else to compare to, that means that your observations are correct. Welkabonz

I am done here; there is no arguing with the deliberately unreasonable.Welkabonz