@zaryia said:
I trust Mueller and Napolitano. Their views are not mutually exclusive.
He specifically stated they were incapable of exonerating him on Obstruction. Obstruction is laid out with evidence, and many legal scholars (including Andrew) agree that it was Obstruction. This does not conflict with Mueller's position that Trump was not exonerated and Congress should decide based off of the evidence (since he could not indict a sitting president).
Mueller’s Signal on Obstruction: Congress Should Take On Trump
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-19/mueller-s-signal-on-obstruction-congress-should-take-on-trump
Of course they are mutually exclusive. They are different conclusions. Just like's barr's conclusion. Barr's conclusion is more compatible Because at least it falls within innocent until proven guilty. If the Mueller's report is unable to conclude obstruction occurred... then there is reasonable doubt thus innocent. It doesn't mean trump is innocent, it just means there isn't enough evidence to prove his guilt.
Mueller does not suggest in the report that congress should settle this. He suggests it is in congress's authority to charge the president with a crime thus he would not be charging the president with a crime. He was tasked with identifying whether or not the president committed a crime. On coordination with Russia he concluded no, on obstruction he concluded there isn't enough evidence to prove obstruction. Its pretty simple and completely incompatible Napolitano's conclusion. And it doesn't meet the legal definition of guilt.
The problem with bloombergs view is its retarded. Mueller's investigation was the investigation. If congress wants to charge they'll have to tread the same ground the investigation did... not use the 400 page report as proof there is obstruction because the 400 page report did not conclude a crime was committed. Congress would need to start their own investigation to clarify whether or not obstruction occurred, not just read into the report what they think Muller wants. Its non sensical to even read it that way.
From the report itself.
Conclusion:
Because we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment , we did not draw ultimate conclusions about the President ' s conduct. The evidence we obtained about the President's actions and intent presents difficult issues that would need to be resolved if we were making a traditional prosecutorial judgment. At the same time, if we had confidence after a thorough investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, we would so state. Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, we are unable to reach that judgment. Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the President committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him.
The fact is the Mueller report did not conclude the President committed a crime. Barr's summary is basically accurate.. except for the exoneration. It seems more likely he wants the Mueller's word to be final, and from a prosecutor's eye's he's basically innocent (until proven guilty).
Several features of the conduct we investigated distinguish it from typical obstruction-ofjustice cases. First, the investigation concerned the President , and some of his actions , such as firing the FBI director , involved facially lawful acts within his Article II authority, which raises constitutional issues discussed below. At the same time, the President's position as the head of the Executive Branch provided him with unique and powerful mean s of influencing official proceedings, subordinate officers , and potential witnesses-all of which is relevant to a potential obstruction-of-justice analysis. Second , unlike cases in which a subject engages in obstruction of justice to cover up a crime , the evidence we obtained did not establish that the President was involved in an underlying crime related to Russian election interference. Although the obstruction statutes do not require proof of such a crime, the absence of that evidence affects the analysis of the President's intent and requires consideration of other possible motives for his conduct. Third, many of the President's acts directed at witnesses, including discouragement of cooperation with the government and suggestions of possible future pardons , took place in public view. That circumstance is unusual, but no principle of law excludes public acts from the reach of the obstruction laws. If the likely effect of public acts is to influence witnesses or alter their testimony, the harm to the justice system's integrity is the same.
Although the series of events we investigated involved discrete acts, the overall pattern of the President's conduct towards the investigations can shed light on the nature of the President 's acts and the inferences that can be drawn about his intent. In particular, the actions we investigated can be divided into two phases , reflecting a possible shift in the President's motives. The first phase covered the period from the President 's first interactions with Corney through the President 's firing of Corney. During that time , the President had been repeatedly told he was not personally under investigation. Soon after the firing of Corney and the appointment of the Special Counsel, however, the President became aware that his own conduct was being investigated in an obstruction-of-justice inquiry. At that point , the President engaged in a second phase of conduct, involving public attacks on the investigation , non-public efforts to control it, and efforts in both public and private to encourage witnesses not to cooperate with the investigation. Judgments about the nature of the President 's motives during each phase would be informed by the totality of the evidence.
What Bloomberg (and other's) is reading as an invention for congress to take action is nonsensical. The section isn't even specific to trump... its labeled "constitutional defenses" and talks about whether or not a president's constitutional authority can shield him from an obstruction case.
Constitutional defenses:
As for constitutional defenses arising from the President's status as the head of the Executive Branch, we recognized that the Department of Justice and the courts have not. definitively resolved these issues. We therefore examined those issues through the framework established by Supreme Court precedent governing separation-of-powers issues. The Department of Justice and the President's personal counsel have recognized that the President is subject to statutes that prohibit obstruction of justice by bribing a witness or suborning perjury because that conduct does not implicate his constitutional authority. With respect to whether the President can be found to have obstructed justice by exercising his powers under Article II of the Constitution, we concluded that Congress has authority to prohibit a President's corrupt use of his authority in order to protect the integrity of the administration of justice .
Under applicable Supreme Court precedent, the Constitution does not categorically and permanently immunize a President for obstructing justice through the use of his Article II powers . The separation-of-powers doctrine authorizes Congress to protect official proceedings, including those of courts and grand juries, from corrupt, obstructive acts regard less of their source. We also concluded that any inroad on presidential authority that would occur from prohibiting corrupt acts does not undermine the President's ability to fulfill his constitutional mission. The term "corruptly " sets a demanding standard. It requires a concrete showing that a person acted with an intent to obtain an improper advantage for himself or someone else, inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others. A preclusion of "corrupt" official action does not diminish the President's ability to exercise Article II powers. For example , the proper supervision of criminal law does not demand freedom for the President to act with a corrupt intention of shielding himself from criminal punishment , avoiding financial liability, or preventing personal embarrassment. To the contrary , a statute that prohibits official action undertaken for such corrupt purposes furthers, rather than hinders, the impartial and evenhanded administration of the law. It also aligns with the President's constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws. Finally, we concluded that in the rare case in which a criminal investigation of the President 's conduct is justified, inquiries to determine whether the President acted for a corrupt motive should not impermissibly chill his performance of his constitutionally assigned duties . The conclusion that Congress may apply the obstruction laws to the President 's corrupt exercise of the powers of office accords with our constitutional system of checks and balances and the principle that no person is above the law.
The decision is NOPE, the constitutional authority does not protect the president, but it is on congress to enforce.
There is NO invitation for congress to do anything. The report is conflicted because while the president's conduct was obstructive.. it cannot prove corruptly so. Its completely incompatible with all these "legal scholars" taking a birds eye view of a 2 year effort. This was the investigation. This is the conclusion. This isn't a prosecutable crime because they didn't meet the standard necessary to even suggest the president committed a crime. There was some iffy conduct because he had the authority over the investigation and didn't trust it. With out the underlying crime of conspiracy its basically impossible to conclude obstruction.
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