A recent thread in OT reminded me of a thought experiment I once posed; I brought it up in an OT thread a while ago, but I realized it might make good discussion material here as well.

The general atheist answer to the question of "What is there after death?" is "nothing", with the justification that our physical bodies are fully and entirely what make us who we are, and that there is nothing beyond "you" than your body.  I recognize there are atheists with different answers to the question, but for the purposes of this thought experiment, we'll assume that this is both the correct answer and the correct justification.

So, keeping that assumption in mind - that the entirety of who "you" are is your physical body - I propose the following thought experiments and invite especially those who agree with the above answer to respond, but anyone can chime in if they want.  There's no right or wrong answer that I'm looking for, and I'm not intending to prove any position wrong; this is purely a hypothetical to make you think about the implications of what you might believe and ensure its logical coherence.

The scenarios are as follows:

Scenario A

Some time in the future, a teleporter is built.  It functions much like a fax machine: it scans your body, makes a note of its exact composition and structure right down to the atomic level, and then it deconstructs your body into its component atoms and places them aside.  It then transmits this information to a receiver, which takes atoms it has stored away and reconstructs your body exactly as it was when you entered the transmitter, right down to the atom.  You enter this teleporter, and as advertised, it deconstructs your body and reconstructs it at the receiver precisely as it entered the transmitter.

The question: Is this person constructed at the receiver "you"?  That is to say, you entered the teleporter a conscious entity perceiving itself as a unique individual apart from all others; is that same consciousness present at the receiver?  Would you experience a momentary lapse in consciousness when your body is deconstructed, and would you then regain consciousness in this newly constructed body in the receiver?  If the answer is "no", what difference is there - if we are nothing more than our physical body, then why would we not experience ourselves as conscious in this new physical body?

Scenario B

The same teleporter as above is created, except there is one fundamental difference: it acts even more like a fax machine now, and rather than deconstructing the person who enters, it leaves that person completely intact.  However, it still scans the person's precise atomic structure and constructs another person precisely the same right down to the atom at the receiver.  You enter this teleporter, and just as it says, it scans you and creates an exact copy of you right down to the atomic level that is constructed at the receiver.

The question: As above, is this person constructed at the receiver "you"?  Would you now be conscious in two different locations at the same time?  If the answer is "no", then as in scenario A, what difference is there?  If, again, we are nothing more than our physical body, then what would differentiate "you" - that is, the conscious entity responding to this question - from this exact copy of you, such that you would only experience consciousness in one of the two bodies, but not the other?  What could you identify as the factor that makes you "you" as opposed to the exact copy of you, if indeed who "you" are is entirely defined by your physical body?

Scenario C

This time, in addition to a machine that creates an exact copy of a subject, we additionally have invented a stasis machine - a machine that renders its inhabitant unconscious, but perfectly preserved.  You enter this stasis machine, and are placed into unconscious stasis.  While you are in this state, the machine to create an exact copy of a subject is activated, and while you are unconscious, an exact copy of you is created and placed into another stasis machine.  These stasis machines are turned off at precisely the same time, and their inhabitants regain consciousness at precisely the same time as well.

The question: Which one of these two individuals is "you"?  That is to say, you were a conscious entity who then lost consciousness, and now two identical unconscious bodies are brought back to consciousness - in which body will you perceive your consciousness as residing?  If your answer is that it will reside in one body but not the other, how do you differentiate between one body and the other?  Keep in mind when answering that they are identical right down to the atomic level, and are thus physically the same body.

I think that should do it for now.  I'm interested to hear your responses!

Edited on Jun 19, 2010 5:18 am PT Edited 6 total times.

It really depends on what is meant by "exact compostion and structure" and also if the sub-atomic level detail would be required for such hocus-pocus. But, if such things were possible, I'd say:

Scenareo A

The person at the other end is not made out the the same physical material as you. That is set aside at the transmitter if I'm not mistaken. I'd imagine that you would experience a loss of conciousness if the process were not instantaneous - it may also hurt. The facsimile - the new you - would have conciousness and memories, as reconstrtucted by neural pathways and brain mapping (2.0).

Scenareo B

As with A, the new person made with new material at point B would be another independent "you" with a seperate conciousness, but the same prior experience and bad habits.

Sceanreo C

For the sake of legal responsibility - all copies should really be you. If a muderer jumped into the copier after committing the crime, all copies would be complicit. This does raise issues about the responsibility of copies for the previous actions of the copied.

But the one made from the original material would be be the most "real" you.

Grounds:

I personally think there is nothing beyond the physical body (and the energy that powers it) and nothing to call a "soul" or "self" that persists after physical death. I can't prove it, but that's what I've come to believe given my experiences.

A

It is the same "person" before and after. Our bodies are a collection of structurized cells that die and reproduce all the time... so to say that we are not the "same person" after the transporter cannot transmit the "persistent self" is kind of absurd from my perspective. Our bodies are constantly altering themselves, and never "persist" in the same sense for more than a few seconds (cells are probably dying all the time).

B

"The Prestige" all over again. And the answer would be yes, it is the "same" person, only doubled. I don't see how even if there was a "persistent self" it couldn't be copied and exist in two bodies at once... especially if that self was not supernatural in origin, but naturally bound and detectable.

C

Again, two "you's." I've never been able to understand the idea of a "persistent self" and I think Buddhism really opened me up to that fact. It just doesn't sit well with me to think that there is somehow, a supernatural "soul" inside my physical body that somehow, cannot be copied and lives on eternally after I die. I can understand energy existing post-mordem, like a gathering of it leaving the body, but a full conscious ghost-like entity that can move between bodies (as in Hinduism) or a "soul" being that ascends to a supernatural realm like Heaven? It just doesn't make sense to me.

I've always been a naturalist... and even if we find "God" or whatever, the thing is, it will cease to be "God" in the sense of it being supernatural, and become natural, and objectively verifiable.

Genetic_Code wrote:

Scenario B You would be conscious in two different locations. You probably wouldn't live very long because you haven't adapted to living in two separate bodies.

You make it seem as if the consciousness would be contiguous across the two bodies... would they be connected, or would they be "the same" but separate ("the same" merely in the sense they were the same until they started experiencing something new)?

Genetic_Code wrote:

Both eyes are directed by one consciousness. In a disorienting sense, both bodies would be directed by one consciousness that is stored within two separate brains. I'm speaking out of my top hat here, because I honestly don't know.

Without a persistent self, how could the consciousness communicate with the other body? Both consciousnesses would be the same when copied, but the split second afterwards they would cease being the same, as they would be experiencing two different sets of sensory inputs.

GabuEx wrote:

RationalAtheist wrote: Scenareo A The person at the other end is not made out the the same physical material as you. That is set aside at the transmitter if I'm not mistaken. I'd imagine that you would experience a loss of conciousness if the process were not instantaneous - it may also hurt. The facsimile - the new you - would have conciousness and memories, as reconstrtucted by neural pathways and brain mapping (2.0). But would it be your consciousness - in other words, would you regain consciousness in this newly constructed body? If not, why not? An atom is an atom - if two items are physically identical, then they are physically identical, so if consciousness is nothing more than a function of your physical body, why would you not be conscious in this new physical body once it regains consciousness?

Your new body would contain a new consciousness that is exactly the same as the transmitted body's one, so it would appear to be the very same consciousness. It would be a separate consciousness though, independent of the first body.

GabuEx wrote:

RationalAtheist wrote: Scenareo B As with A, the new person made with new material at point B would be another independent "you" with a seperate conciousness, but the same prior experience and bad habits. But, again, if consciousness is nothing more than a function of one's physical body, then what would make one body's consciousness yours while the other is not? What could you point to within that other you that would differentiate it from you, and would make its consciousness not your own?

Both new people would initially have exactly the same memories, experience and identity to start off with. They would both have identical singular independent consciousnesses, but their shared experience would stop at the transmission of the facsimile. It would diverge from there on in.

GabuEx wrote:

RationalAtheist wrote: Sceanreo C For the sake of legal responsibility - all copies should really be you. If a murderer jumped into the copier after committing the crime, all copies would be complicit. This does raise issues about the responsibility of copies for the previous actions of the copied. But the one made from the original material would be be the most "real" you. But what would make it, as you say "the most 'real' you"? It is identical in every way, and it wakes up at exactly the same time as you. What makes one of the two bodies "you", but not the other? What provides the differentiator?

There would be no discernible difference between the facsimile and the original, so the only differentiators would be time lived, method of origin, and the originality of the materials used in copying. I used "real" to infer original and didn't mean to imply that one version had any more significance.

What do you think yourself, Gabu?

GabuEx wrote:

But would you be conscious within that body once it is reconstructed?  That is, would it truly be "you", the same "you" who was conscious prior to the initial deconstruction?

Yeah I sort of wondered about that in my edit.
The way I see it (if I stretch it a bit) we can say that a previous version of our consciousness dies every second but it is still us.
Perhaps its that case here too. Perhaps yes our own conscious dies momentarily in the process of reconstruction but it is still our consciousness after that. It is still me experiencingit and not just an exact copy of me with now its own will, separate from mine (who I would be dead if I considered the new "me" as just a copy of me but not me).
Although I reach that "conclusion" only if I consider the above happens. If I dont I dont think the new me is me; its just a copy of me. Yes its identity is the same as me, but it is a separate entity than the previous me.
But.....idk.

GabuEx wrote:

But the question is talking about "you" as in the conscious individual - would your consciousness be in this second body as well immediately after its creation?  If not, what differentiates you from the other body?  They are physically identical.

No I think my consciousness would still be in my original body, not the copy. The copy is an identical to me, yet separate, consciousness.

What differentiates me is I guess the fact that my consciousness has been with my body from the beginning. There is no reason why my consciousness would be transferred to the other body. Besides the proceedure here is one of copying not trasferring.

GabuEx wrote:

But which is "you"?  When both bodies are reanimated, in which one do "you" inhabit consciousness?

The same as above and for the same reasons. My body stays with the body it originally was. I dont find a reason to assume it will move to another body.

Teenaged wrote:

Yeah I sort of wondered about that in my edit. The way I see it (if I stretch it a bit) we can say that a previous version of our consciousness dies every second but it is still us. Perhaps its that case here too. Perhaps yes our own conscious dies momentarily in the process of reconstruction but it is still our consciousness after that. It is still me experiencingit and not just an exact copy of me with now its own will, separate from mine (who I would be dead if I considered the new "me" as just a copy of me but not me). Although I reach that "conclusion" only if I consider the above happens. If I dont I dont think the new me is me; its just a copy of me. Yes its identity is the same as me, but it is a separate entity than the previous me. But.....idk.

Again, though, the question remains: what makes one body "you" while the other is not "you"?  If one's consciousness - that is, that which makes you "you" - is purely physical in nature, then why would a copy not have the same consciousness?

Teenaged wrote:

No I think my consciousness would still be in my original body, not the copy. The copy is an identical to me, yet separate, consciousness. What differentiates me is I guess the fact that my consciousness has been with my body from the beginning. There is no reason why my consciousness would be transferred to the other body. Besides the proceedure here is one of copying not trasferring.

Teenaged wrote:

The same as above and for the same reasons. My body stays with the body it originally was. I dont find a reason to assume it will move to another body.

But the whole thing here, though, is that if what defines your consciousness is entirely within your physical body, then that would imply that a physically identical body should also have a completely identical consciousness.  What you are saying here is effectively denying that, which seems to me would also implicitly deny the idea that that is the full extent of consciousness.

GabuEx wrote:

So then, to make sure I understand, you do believe that you would lose consciousness, but would then regain consciousness in the reconstructed body?

Yes. I can't know for sure, but I don't believe there is a "persistent self" that exists beyond the physical body, nor cannot be "copied."

GabuEx wrote:

But would you experience consciousness in two bodies at the same time? In other words, would your consciousness expand to inhabit this second body as well, or would it have its own consciousness? And if it would have its own consciousness, then why? If the only thing responsible for your consciousness is your physical body, then how could two physically identical bodies have different consciousnesses? What makes the difference?

You are implying that the consciousnesses would be connected and/or aware of one another. I am positing that the consciousnesses would be "the same" when they were copied, but as soon as they are transferred into separate bodies, they would lose contiguous contact with one another, and become "different" in the sense they would have different experiences in different bodies.

The "difference" is the sensory experience. We are defined by what we experience mentally (and our biological predispositions leading to more likely outcomes over others). For example; Body X is in Room A, Room A is blue and square. Body Y is in Room B, Room B is green and round. When the copied consciousness is implanted in the two separate bodies, as soon as they open their eyes and start perceiving the world around them, they cease to be the same consciousness, and in essence the same person.

GabuEx wrote:

Well, yes, two "you's"... but which one is truly "you"? When you were put in stasis, you perceived yourself as a conscious entity that inhabits a body. When you wake up, you will (if I read your response correctly) still be present and perceiving yourself still as a conscious entity that inhabits a body... but which body would it be? And why? As before, what makes the difference, and what would enable someone to point to one of the two bodies and declare that to be the "you" - i.e., the consciousness - that existed before the copying?

Again, there is the implication that the "consciousness" is somehow a contiguous "soul" or "spirit" that can perceive things when copied. I am saying outright, that any "copy" of the consciousness (i.e. the body in which it inhabits) becomes "different" and in essence a separate "person" as soon as it perceives different sensory inputs.

I can't prove either way, but that is what I see happening... as I have no evidence to believe the consciousness is a contiguous, eternal (or existing post-mordem) thing. Merely a result of the biological and electrical manifestations of the body.

GabuEx wrote:

RationalAtheist wrote: Your new body would contain a new consciousness that is exactly the same as the transmitted body's one, so it would appear to be the very same consciousness. It would be a separate consciousness though, independent of the first body. What would make it different, though? If one's consciousness is purely a product of one's physical body, then would the recreation of one's exact physical body not also recreate the exact same consciousness? Right now, you perceive yourself as a conscious entity in a body; if you went into this teleporter, what would be different such that that same consciousness would not be present in it as well? Where did "you" go in the process?

To all intents and purposes, you would appear at the other end in a physical and conscious form. The re-creation of the body would also include the re-creation of a consciousness with no discernible difference. In your experiment, the matter would get left behind - reduced to its atomic form. At the receiver, new material is used to construct information conveyed through the machine. So "you" in your reduced physical form would be at the transmitter and you - as constructed form new materials - with your consciousness would be at the receiver.

GabuEx wrote:

RationalAtheist wrote: Both new people would initially have exactly the same memories, experience and identity to start off with. They would both have identical singular independent consciousnesses, but their shared experience would stop at the transmission of the facsimile. It would diverge from there on in. But I'm not sure if this is addressing the root issue that this thought experiment is getting at. As I said, right now you perceive yourself as a conscious entity in a body, and typically atheists will say that that is simply a product of one's physical body. Why, then, would "you" not also inhabit the other body, if indeed it is physically identical? If consciousness is simply a product of one's physical body, then what creates the difference that makes them independent consciousnesses? This thought experiment's purpose is largely to investigate the real nature and essence of what consciousness truly is and is not, and I feel that this may be getting lost in the details along the way.

I'm trying to answer as honestly as I think possible about what I genuinely believe would happen.

I think you would also inhabit the other body as a separate, but similar, consciousness. It seems logical that, if a consciousness is a super-set of receptors, experience, awareness, impulses, knowledge, belief, decision-making and emotion, etc, then it would all be particular to one human nervous system.

Why not think that two identical individuals with the same experience and views could be the result of copying? Why couldn't 2 consciousnesses not be the result of duplicating one consciousness? Why does this view diverge with the thrust of the thought experiment? I feel like I've failed, but don't know why.

GabuEx wrote:

RationalAtheist wrote: There would be no discernible difference between the facsimile and the original, so the only differentiators would be time lived, method of origin, and the originality of the materials used in copying. I used "real" to infer original and didn't mean to imply that one version had any more significance. Right, but my point is that one's origin and actual time lived are more or less irrelevant in terms of the actual physical state of the body. If "you" would identifiably perceive yourself as a conscious individual in one but not both of the bodies, despite their being physically identical, then the question is why - what is different between the two that would cause the consciousnesses too be different even at the moment that both regain consciousness?

I believe its that as a human, I only have the ability for one physical consciousness. If there were two of me, we'd be independent thinkers, both separately conscious (surprised and horrified). We would both probably think the same thing at the same time immediately after the duplication, but as our perspective and experience differ, so our consciousnesses would develop down their own paths.

GabuEx wrote:

RationalAtheist wrote: What do you think yourself, Gabu? Right, my apologies, I suppose I should have answered these questions myself as well. Well, to be honest I don't really know, which is kind of a boring answer, but it's basically nonetheless the truth. Based on thoughts such as the ones in this thread, I tend to believe that there is more to consciousness than one's physical body, which to me would indicate that the answer would be that scenario A would be undetermined and that in scenarios B and C "you" would inhabit the same body you've always inhabited, since the new body, although physically identical, would lack an identical source of consciousness (whatever that source may be). If I believed that consciousness was entirely determined by one's physical body, though, then I feel that I would have great difficulty answering any of these questions, which is why I was interested to see others' responses who do believe that.

I'm not sure I understand the difficulty in answering the questions. I'm worried its gone over my head. Are you saying that an individual can not be cloned because a source of consciousness can not be found?