I've started my defense of Christianity series on youtube and here on Gamespot, and I think the post that is most pertinent to the issue of theism vs. atheism that has yet to be released is my discussion on Skepticism.
Today I'm going to talk about the problem of Skepticism. Simply put, Skepticism in present times is the epistemology which says that all claims to knowledge require some sort of justification, and that the skeptic, the person doubting a certain claim to knowledge, bears absolutely no burden of proof.
This has very serious implications for the Christian faith. Skepticism leads to the rise of the idea that weak atheism is a sort of default position that need be based on nothing more than the lack of evidence of theism, and that because of this, theists do not have justification for their belief, and therefore we should not believe in God.
I aim to show that this sort of epistemology is not as universal as atheists would claim.
Let's get some historical background to appreciate this more fully. Skepticism had its heyday in pre-christian times with Academic skepticism, and then Christian writers like St. Augustine defeated them, and skepticism sort of died off for the next 1500 years, and then experienced a revival with people like Descartes. Academic skepticism held to two tenets
1: We do not have knowledge of anything
2: We have knowledge of the above statement
The problem is that this is ultimately self-refuting. To say that we have knowledge that we have no knowledge implies further that there is such a thing as truth, that there is meaning behind the statement "there is no knowledge" and that the person uttering the statement exists. Further, these sorts of skeptics never really showed why someone cannot assert other truths besides "we have no knowledge" or the beliefs it obviously entails.
Skepticism, as stated above, experienced a revival with Descartes, who advocated a methodological doubt, which said that knowledge requires certainty, and that we could only know that we ourselves existed with "I think, therefore I am"
There are several varieties of skepticism, and we will discuss them briefly here
First is "iterative skepticism", which is when the skeptic constantly asks "well how do you know? Well how do you know that? And that? And that?...". This is not a real position, its just a word game, and can be dismissed as such.
Second is "metaepistemological skepticism", which has doubts about epistemology and philosophy itself, and advocates a reduction of philosophy to a branch of natural science, like saying that epistemology is a branch of neuro-psychology.
There are several obvious problems with this position
1: It rejects the normative element within epistemology, the notion that one has rights to believe certain propositions, or that one has an obligation to believe certain things
2: Science holds to certain unscientific assumptions, like the existence of truth, the existence and knowability of the external world, the uniformity of nature, etc.
3: This argument itself uses philosophy to question the reliability of philosophy. If you knock out philosophy, you knock out your own objections to philosophy
Then there is methodological skepticism, which says that you should question claims to knowledge to get to knowledge. This isn't so much as a position as it is a tool to help one get knowledge
Then there is knowledge skepticism, which sets the standards for knowledge so high, and concludes that there is no knowledge.
Then there is mitigated and unmitigated skepticism. Mitigated skepticism says that one holds to knowledge claims tentatively, and unmitigated skepticism holds that there is no knowledge.
Next, there is global vs. local skepticism. Global skepticism says that there is no knowledge in any area of human thought. Local skepticism says that some areas, but not others, create knowledge. For instance, many local skeptics say that science gives us knowledge, but ethics and theology do not.
Finally, there is first-order vs. second-order skepticism. First-order skepticism directs skepticism towards everyday beliefs, or rather beliefs about the external world. Second-order skepticism directs skepticism towards knowledge of beliefs. How does one know that they know X (?) the second-order skeptic asks.
Now that we have gotten that out of the way, we shall examine the many arguments for skepticism
The first argument is the argument from error or fallibility. Simply put, we've been wrong before, and we might be wrong now
The second argument is the various arguments that it is possible that we are wrong. We could be a brain in a vat, or in the matrix, or possessed by an evil demon. Therefore we should not be certain about knowledge claims because we could be wrong
The final argument the problem of the transfer of justification. Most of the time, our beliefs confer justification on to other beliefs inductively. We sense a tree, but it does not gurantee that a tree is there. This goes with all other beliefs which confer justification upon another in an inductive way. Because of this fact, we may be wrong in just about everything we believe. Therefore, we do not have knowledge.
Now that we've given an exposition of Skepticism and the arguments for Skepticism, I want to offer two points in a broad critique of skepticism, first by showing why skepticism itself has major problems, and second by giving short rebuttals to the arguments for skepticism.
Now, the argument against skepticism I shall give is the problem of criterion. The problem of criterion is simply this:
If we are to know anything, P, then we have to know two more propositions, Q, which is how we know something, and R, how P satisfies Q.
Here we run into a major problem, Q and R are themselves knowledge claims. So therefore we need Q', which is how we know Q, and R' which is how Q satisfies Q', and we need to do the same for R. But Q' and R' are themselves knowledge claims. Allow me to explain it in a different way. If we know some proposition, then we know how we know that proposition, but how do we know THAT proposition? And how do we know THAT proposition? So the problem of criterion leads to a vicious infinite regress.
There are 3 main responses to this problem.
The first is skepticism, which says that this is a good argument, and therefore no one has any knowledge. But this is itself a self-refuting claim, and surely cannot be correct, for if someone said that we have no knowledge, then they would be making a knowledge claim. Secondly, it undercuts the reasons given for skepticism, for the arguments given for skepticism rely upon knowing the falsity of certain propositions, but those themselves are knowledge claims.
The second response is Methodism. Methodism says that one starts out with a method of garnering knowledge, and then uses this method to justify propositions, or see whether propositions are justified. The problem however is whatever method one uses is itself a claim to knowledge, and therefore leads once again into a vicious infinite regress.
The third and final response to the problem, which we shall defend today, is particularism. Particularists teach that we start out with clear cases where people have knowledge, or in other words, we have knowledge even if we don't know what knowledge is, and upon these cases we build our method of justification.
There are 2 skeptical responses to particularism
First, the skeptic could allege that Skepticism begs the question by assuming that people have knowledge, and that the particularist doesn't really know because even if we assume cases of knowledge, they could be wrong. There are 4 responses we shall give to that claim
1: Skepticism is STILL self-defeating, and therefore people must have knowledge
2: By asking the question "How do you know", The Skeptic is forcing the particularist to become a Methodist because he is implying that there is a criteria for knowledge before we have knowledge. but we saw how that leads to a vicious infinite regress.
3: The particularist could say that logical possibility is simply not enough, and that we need a defeater for these beliefs
4: Finally, the particularist holds the high ground because it avoids a vicious infinite regress, unlike Methodism, and accords with the fact that people DO have knowledge, unlike skepticism.
Before we go on to the second major objection to particularism, let's look at this diagram, taken from page 101 of Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. The purpose of this diagram is to outline the different approaches to knowledge.
First off, let's talk about the burden of proof. For the skeptic, the burden of proof is on the cognitivist, the one who is making the claim to knowledge. By contrast, for the particularist, it is the skeptic who shoulder's the burden of proof.
Second, the Particularist ays that knowledge does not require certainty, while the skeptic says that knowledge does require certainty because the cognitivist could be wrong
Third, the phrase "You might be wrong" as used by the particularist, implies an epistemic "might", where there are reasons to doubt the claim to knowledge. By contrast, the skeptic merely says that there is no logical contradiction in a state of affairs in which the cognitivist is wrong. So "You might be wrong" is of no consequence for the particularist, because showing the mere logical possibility of falsity is not the same as showing reasons to doubt the cognitivist
Fourth, the way of dealing with the skeptic. The particularist holds that the skeptic must be rebutted, or rather must merely show that the reasons for doubting the cognitivist are wrong. The skeptic, by contrast, holds that the skeptic must be refuted, in that show that the reasons for doubt are wrong, and that the claim in question should be believed.
Fifth, The particularist and the skeptic hold to two different tasks of epistemology. The particularist holds that the paradigm of goals in epistemology is finding more justified true belief, while the skeptic merely believes that we should just avoid unjustified beliefs.
Finally, skeptics and particularists have two different understandings of the phrase "Right to be sure" as used by the particularist. The skeptic understands this to mean that the particularist can dogmatically assert any claim he wants without having to look at the evidence. By contrast, the particularist merely says that he has a right to rely on the truth of a claim in explaining other things, and in forming other beliefs, but remain open to future evidence.
So now that we have shown the different approaches to knowledge, let's examine the second objection to particularism, which is probably the objection you thought of first. That objection is: Could one not abuse particularism and assert any sort of claim that they want, under the label of "particularist"?
Now that we've understood how the particularist approaches knowledge, we can give a clear response. Just because it is possible that the particularist is abusing his particularism, it does not follow that he really is abusing it. The skeptic must show that we should believe that particularism is being abused in a certain instance. Moreover, the particularist does not need a set of criteria for determining when particularism is or is not being abused before he adopts a particularist view of a certain proposition.
Now that we have given our arguments against skepticism, let us respond to the arguments for skepticism.
First, the argument from error, which is the whole "I have been wrong before, I could be wrong now" argument. Just because one has been wrong in the past, it does not follow that one is wrong now. Until one has defeaters for current beliefs, we are still justified in holding to our sensory experiences. Second, we could give a dialectical objection to this argument by merely pointing out that knowledge about past false beliefs is itself an instance of knowledge, and therefore people have knowledge
The second argument about the brain-in-the-vat is flawed in that logical possibility of falsity does not gurantee any sort of epistemic possibility of falsity, or rather, it is not itself a reason to doubt knowledge claims.
The third argument, the transfer of justification. This is still not an argument against knowledge because knowledge does not require certainty, and people can still have inductive knowledge without a theory of transfer of justification.
Now that we've covered the broad philosophical issue of skepticism, I want to talk about naturalism, and how naturalism may imply global skepticism.
Yes, this is the evolutionary argument against naturalism, as given by Alvin Plantinga.
Plantinga, and a number of other philosophers, have argued that if naturalism and evolution are to be believed, then we are irrational to believe it, because evolution, in all probability, would not produce reliable cognitive faculties that give us truth.
The main reason for this point is that natural selection doesn't give a damn about whether we have true belief, it is only concerned with whether we behave in a certain manner.
Now the naturalist might object, and often does object, that true beliefs are selectively advantageous. This however is not necessarily true because the relation between our beliefs and our actions could have evolved in 5 different ways
1: Beliefs could be mere epiphenomenon and have no relation whatsoever to the external world or our behavior in that world
2: Beliefs could be caused by the external world, but not cause behavior.
3: Beliefs could cause behavior, but not by virtue of their content. Think of a poem that is read very loudly, so loudly that it breaks glass. But the content and meaning of the poem did not break the glass, it was irrelevant to the breaking glass.
4: Beliefs could cause behavior by virtue of their content, but could be maladaptive because it causes them to survive, albeit less efficiently, or causes maladaptive behavior which is overridden by other more adaptive behavior. For the former, many scientists have stated that large brains are inefficient because they take up lots of metabolic energy
5: Finally, evolution could produce a state of affairs in which beliefs are causally related to behavior and are true.
But this is improbable because for every selectively advantageous behavior, there are a plethora of false beliefs that could produce it.
Let's take a look at Paul, a prehistoric hominid who needs to run away from a tiger or he will be eaten. Let's say that Paul wants to be eaten, and that in order to be eaten, he needs to run away from the tiger and climb up a tree. This false belief would cause the exact same selectively advantageous behavior. Or say that Paul believes that the tiger is an illusion and that it is a que to run a marathon in the opposite direction. This too would create the same selectively advantageous behavior. Whatever selectively advantageous behavior, one can think of plenty of examples of false beliefs which could produce the same behavior. Because of this, genetic drift would cause these false beliefs to become much more common than true beliefs.
Given all these reasons, we have very good grounds for believing that natural selection would produce improperly functioning cognitive faculties. Since our cognitive faculties are not working, we are not justified in believing naturalism. Ergo, naturalism is self-defeating
Some have responded to this argument by saying that we use our cognitive faculties to form true beliefs all the time, and therefore have reason to trust our cognitive faculties. But this is circular because it assumes that our cognitive faculties are working.
Some have responded by agreeing that our cognitive faculties are not working, and that because they are not working, we cannot trust the evolutionary argument against naturalism. Since we cannot trust the evolutionary argument against naturalism, therefore we don't have reason to doubt our cognitive faculties. But this is viciously circular because once we are back to the position of saying that our cognitive faculties being trustworthy, we once again can trust the evolutionary argument against naturalism.
Â
Log in to comment